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INTRODUCTION 
Around noon on September 26, 2002, a dual Canadian–Syrian citizen 
named Maher Arar walked between terminals at Kennedy Airport in New 
York as he returned from vacation.1  However, instead of returning to work 
in Montreal, Arar spent the night in the airport.2  He had been detained by 
Immigration and Naturalization Service officials and FBI agents on suspi-
cion of associating with al Qaeda.3  Only twelve days later, Arar slept—if 
he slept at all—in a six-by-three foot underground cell in Syria.4  U.S. offi-
cials had questioned him for days in New York before he was sent to Jordan 
in a small plane and then delivered to Syria.5  During his first interroga-
tions—which Arar alleges were facilitated by the United States—he was 
beaten with a two-inch-thick electric cable.6  All told, Arar lived in his 
small Syrian cell for ten months and was not recovered by Canadian offi-
cials for an entire year.7  Although his ordeal has become a notorious story 
about U.S. antiterrorism efforts, it is impossible to truly understand the fear 
and pain of Arar’s experience.  It is, perhaps, easier to empathize with his 
desire for reparations from the U.S. government. 
 In recent years, several people like Arar, detained or mistreated by the 
United States during the “Global War on Terror” (GWOT),8 have brought 
Bivens actions seeking compensation from executive officials for alleged 
constitutional torts.9  These suits are “inevitable”10 and will become increa-
singly common as the repercussions of the GWOT continue filtering 
through the judicial system.11  Opponents and victims of the GWOT view a 
 
1  Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). 
2  Id. 
3  Id. at 566. 
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  The term “Global War on Terror” includes the government’s and military actors’ accusations and 
enforcement activities—e.g., detention, torture, forcible transport, and illegal searches—directed at sus-
pected enemies as part of U.S. efforts to deter and extinguish terrorist threats or related to U.S. military 
activity in the Middle East.  This focus on people suspected of terrorism-related activity is not meant to 
ignore or minimize the extent to which civilians and military personnel and their families have been and 
continue to become victims of the GWOT. 
9  See, e.g., Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (al-Kidd III), 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Arar, 585 F.3d 559; Turkmen 
v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542 (2d Cir. 2009); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Khorrami v. Rolince, 539 F.3d 782 (7th Cir. 2008); Padilla v. Yoo, 633 
F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Farag v. United States, 587 F. Supp. 2d 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008); In re 
Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85 (D.D.C. 2007); Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 1:04-CV-
01809, 2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 
(2009); Complaint, Hamad v. Gates, No. 2:10-CV-00591 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2010), 2010 WL 
2935653. 
10  George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 82 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 841, 847 (2009). 
11  Id. at 841. 
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Bivens right of action as an appropriate safeguard for human rights and the 
rule of law and have focused on securing the availability of such suits for 
wronged individuals.12  Although GWOT plaintiffs face inherent challenges 
in seeking to invoke the nearly dead Bivens right of action,13 these obstacles 
to relief are not insurmountable.   
The qualified immunity defense almost universally claimed by the de-
fendant officials in detainees’ Bivens actions14 has received less attention 
from courts and commentators than the questions of whether constitutional 
rights and Bivens actions should be available to detainees, but it likely 
presents the more formidable barrier to compensatory relief.  In January 
2009, in Pearson v. Callahan,15 the Supreme Court overturned the qualified 
immunity test that had been mandatory since 2001.16  The old test, taken 
from Saucier v. Katz, required courts to consider the constitutional merits of 
the plaintiff’s claim before determining whether the constitutional right in-
volved was “clearly established” when the defendant official acted.17  The 
Pearson Court, in removing this sequencing requirement, asserted that 
courts could decide most cases solely on the “clearly established” ques-
tion.18  However, recognizing that the mandatory sequence of the Saucier 
test serves important notice-giving and rights-development functions, the 
Court explained that merits-first sequencing remains “especially valuable” 
 
12  See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. for Constitutional Rights, Six Friend of the Court Briefs Ask Su-
preme Court to Hear Case of Rendition Survivor Maher Arar (Mar. 8, 2010), http://ccrjustice.org/
newsroom/press-releases/six-friend-court-briefs-ask-supreme-court-hear-case-rendition-survivor-maher.  
Ultimately, the Supreme Court declined to hear Arar’s petition.  Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409 
(2010).  
Indeed, the Bivens cause of action is, to some degree, a remedy for the “presentist bias (or ‘myopia’) 
[that] often afflicts officials, who order short-term fixes like mass detentions or curbs on free speech 
with troubling long-term consequences.”  Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Ac-
tions, National Security Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 198 (2010) (footnote 
omitted).  Potential downsides to the extension of a Bivens right of action to GWOT detainees include 
enemy use of litigation as a tactic (or weapon) of distraction.  See, e.g., Kristina A. Kiik, Comment, 
Quantum of Competence: Balancing Bivens During the War on Terror, 62 SMU L. REV. 1945, 1946–47 
(2009). 
13  See Brown, supra note 10, at 845; see also id. at 845 n.15 (citing sources expressing concern 
about whether Bivens actions continue to be viable).  But see Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Suc-
cess of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 
809, 837–43 (2010) (reporting that plaintiff success rates in Bivens actions are higher than commentators 
have reported).  
14  See, e.g., al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2089; Arar, 585 F.3d at 563; Turkmen, 589 F.3d at 54445; 
Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 528; Khorrami, 539 F.3d at 786; Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030; Farag, 587 F. 
Supp. 2d at 443; Iraq & Afg. Detainees, 479 F. Supp. 2d at 92; Elmaghraby, 2005 WL 2375202, at *10. 
15  129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
16  See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
17  Id. at 200. 
18  Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 
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for claims that are unlikely to arise in other law-developing suits where 
qualified immunity is unavailable.19 
This Comment argues that courts should follow the Saucier sequence 
when evaluating Bivens claims brought by victims of the GWOT because 
these claims fit into the “especially valuable” category.  To date, lower 
courts have disagreed as to whether they should apply Saucier sequencing 
to these claims.  However, this Comment shows that the constitutional 
rights of the victims of the GWOT and the constitutionality of executive de-
tention policies are unlikely to develop through alternative legal procedures.  
Therefore, the lower courts should address the constitutional merits of these 
claims before proceeding to the question of whether any constitutional 
rights that may have been violated were “clearly established” when the de-
fendant official acted.  Additionally, the Supreme Court should explicitly 
endorse the continued value of the Saucier sequence for assessing qualified 
immunity in GWOT Bivens claims.  
Part I of this Comment introduces Bivens actions and the defense of 
qualified immunity and reviews the recent Pearson decision recasting the 
Saucier sequence as discretionary.  Part II explains why victims of the 
GWOT are precisely the type of plaintiffs in whose suits qualified immuni-
ty determinations should continue to require a merits-first test.  Part II ana-
lyzes injunctive and declaratory relief, habeas corpus petitions, and motions 
to suppress evidence, in order to show that detainee rights are unlikely to 
develop through these alternative rights of action.  Part III examines contra-
dictory decisions by the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit and shows that 
the lower courts have applied Saucier sequencing inconsistently to the qual-
ified immunity defense in detainees’ Bivens actions.  This Part then predicts 
how this lower court confusion will affect the Judiciary Branch’s notice-
giving and rights-development functions in the U.S. antiterrorism efforts.  
Part IV addresses common criticisms leveled against Saucier sequencing 
and demonstrates why they are misconceived in the context of GWOT vic-
tims’ Bivens actions.  Part IV then explains why the Judiciary Branch 
should assume any role at all rather than defer to the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches in shaping wartime detainee rights and the parameters for fu-
ture wartime executive action.  It argues that judicial involvement is 
important because of the infrequent opportunities to clarify and update con-
stitutional laws related to wartime activities and the Judiciary Branch’s 
quintessential role of protecting the rights of unpopular minorities. 
 
19  Id.  
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Bivens Actions for Global War on Terror Detainees 
In 1971, the Supreme Court decided that a person can sue for monetary 
damages when federal officials violate that person’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.20  Since 1971, the Court has extended the availability of Bivens suits 
to vindicate other constitutional violations as well.21  Just as § 1983 permits 
tort claimants to bring actions against agents acting under color of state law, 
Bivens provides the only mechanism by which individuals can seek damag-
es for federal officials’ violations of their constitutional rights.22   
Unlike § 1983 claims, no federal statute expressly authorizes Bivens 
suits.23  Each time a court permits a novel Bivens claim, it creates a new 
right of action.  Even when a plaintiff sufficiently pleads that federal offi-
cials violated her constitutional right, her claim still may be defeated by 
(1) “special factors counseling hesitation”24 to create a new right of action 
or (2) the congressional provision of “an alternative remedy which it expli-
citly declared to be a substitute for recovery directly under the Constitu-
tion.”25   
To date, GWOT Bivens plaintiffs have primarily alleged violations re-
lating to their detention and alleged mistreatment both by U.S. interrogators 
and jailors and by foreign countries to which the United States transferred 
them.26  Courts have been reluctant to recognize new Bivens rights of action 
for these plaintiffs even though they have not identified a substitute cause 
of action for the constitutional violations the GWOT victims assert.  None 
of the existing statutory schemesthe Alien Tort Statute,27 the Torture Vic-
tim Protection Act,28 the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,29 or the Feder-
 
20  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
21  See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (extending Bivens to violations of the Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 
(1979) (recognizing a Bivens action for a violation of the plaintiff’s due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment). 
22  James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 98 GEO.  L.J. 117, 123 (2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  
23  Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 125. 
24  Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18 (quoting Davis, 442 U.S. at 245) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
25  Id. at 18–19 (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397; Davis, 442 U.S. at 245–47).  
26  See, e.g., supra note 9 (listing cases that featured these claims). 
27  See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 112 (D.D.C. 2007) (“[T]he Alien Tort 
Statute [28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)] is not a federal statute that authorizes recovery against a federal em-
ployee.”); Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1161 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Access to Courts]. 
28  Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; see Access to Courts, supra 
note 27, at 1161.  Under the Torture Victim Protection Act, an addendum to the Alien Tort Statute, the 
defendant must have acted under “actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation,” 
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 § 2, a requirement that excludes claims against U.S. officials who 
acted only under domestic law.   
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al Tort Claims Act30—authorizes victims of wartime executive action to 
seek damages from federal officials for constitutional violations.  Nor do 
the Geneva Conventions31 give GWOT victims a right of action for damag-
es based on torture violations.32  The courts have foreclosed most GWOT 
Bivens actions based on “special factors counseling hesitation.”33  They 
have not extended Bivens actions to detainees held at Guantánamo Bay,34 
and plaintiffs have not yet come forward with Bivens claims related to de-
tention and treatment at other foreign sites.  Indeed, courts have only recent-
ly begun to accept Bivens claims by U.S. citizens detained as “enemy 
combatants” in the United States.35   
The Supreme Court’s broad view of special factors has made Bivens 
relief all but impossible to obtain for many plaintiffs.36  The special factors 
                                                                                                                           
29  Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (2000), invalidated in part by 
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see Access to Courts, supra note 27, at 1162 n.28 (“Con-
gress’s stated purpose in enacting the [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] was to restore strict scrutiny 
review to Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, not to deter torture.” (citing Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 
512 F.3d 644, 670–71 (D.C. Cir. 2008))). 
30  Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–80 (2006); see Access to Courts, supra 
note 27, at 1160 (“Congress enacted the FTCA [Federal Tort Claims Act] to make the government liable 
for certain ‘garden-variety torts’ by federal employees, such as the negligent operation of government 
motor vehicles.” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 706 n.4 (2004))). 
31  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 356, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War, Aug. 
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
32  See Access to Courts, supra note 27, at 1161.  But see Deborah Pearlstein, U.S. Supreme Court 
Can’t Wait to Say More About the Geneva Conventions, OPINIO JURIS (Jan. 29, 2010, 2:20 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2010/01/29/us-supreme-court-can%e2%80%99t-wait-to-say-more-about-the-geneva-
conventions (discussing dissents from a denial of certiorari in a case in which the Supreme Court could 
have “settle[d] once and for all” whether detainees can invoke the Geneva Conventions in federal court). 
The U.S. government has established several Foreign Claims Commissions (FCCs) in Iraq to com-
pensate Iraqi citizens for injuries suffered during the U.S. war efforts there, but the claims settled by the 
FCCs usually involve injuries like inadvertent killings at checkpoints or property damage in vehicle col-
lisions.  See Access to Courts, supra note 27, at 1164.  Prisoners seeking reparation for wrongful or ab-
usive detention have received very little of this compensation.  In a few settlements, the United States 
has paid between $350 (for lost cash and documents) and $5000 (for lost wages).  Id. at 1165.  
33  See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 130 (pointing specifically to Wilson v. Libby, 
535 F.3d 697, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008), and Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 663, 667); see also Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 
F.3d 559, 564 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (“[I]f a civil remedy in damages is to be created for harms suf-
fered in the context of extraordinary rendition, it must be created by Congress . . . .”), cert. denied, 130 
S. Ct. 3409 (2010).  
34  See, e.g., Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 530–32 & n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (refusing to permit a Bivens ac-
tion by former Guantánamo Bay detainees), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Al-Zahrani v. Rums-
feld, 684 F. Supp. 2d 103, 11112 (D.D.C. 2010) (same).  
35  In 2009, two courts within the Ninth Circuit permitted two such Bivens suits.  See al-Kidd v. 
Ashcroft (al-Kidd II), 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011); Padilla v. 
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  These cases are discussed more fully infra at Part III.B. 
36  See William P. Kratzke, Some Recommendations Concerning Tort Liability of Government and 
Its Employees for Torts and Constitutional Torts, 9 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1105, 1150 (1996); Daniel L. 
Rotenberg, Private Remedies for Constitutional Wrongs—A Matter of Perspective, Priority, and 
Process, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 77, 108 (1986). 
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inquiry has devolved from a focus on congressional participation in crafting 
damages relief to sensitivity to “any concern the Court might find important 
to the creation of a cause of action.”37  In GWOT Bivens suits, courts have 
had no difficulty declining to create a new Bivens right of action based on 
what Professor Vladeck has termed the “national security exception to Bi-
vens.”38 
However, recent jurisprudential and scholarly developments may free 
courts to consider recognizing novel GWOT Bivens claims.  Two scholars 
have argued that Congress’s enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act and 
the Westfall Act clearly demonstrates its explicit ratification of the Bivens 
action39 and that this manifest approval means courts should presume a Bi-
vens remedy is available in the absence of clear congressional intent to 
preclude one.40  In the terrorism context, the Supreme Court’s extension of 
constitutional habeas corpus rights to Guantánamo Bay detainees in Bou-
mediene v. Bush in 200841 may suggest that the Constitution should protect 
foreign detainees held at other extraterritorial U.S. detention facilities.42  
Boumediene relied on the “objective degree of control” that the United 
States exercises at the detention facility in question,43 so Boumediene might 
not be limited to Guantánamo Bay and its unique territorial status.44 
 
37  Kiik, supra note 12, at 1959. 
38  Id. at 1949 & n.38 (quoting Stephen I. Vladeck, Rights Without Remedies: The Newfound Na-
tional Security Exception to Bivens, A.B.A. NAT’L SECURITY L. REP., July 2006, at 4–5) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted); see, e.g., Arar, 585 F.3d at 573–77 (describing the broad range of “special factors 
counseling hesitation,” including executive prerogatives and the need to protect classified information, 
that led it to prohibit the plaintiff’s Bivens action). 
As a positive matter, as Professor Brown notes, “to designate the entire war on terror as a special 
factor is perhaps a stretch beyond previously recognized contexts given that those contexts are both nar-
rower and more specific,” Brown, supra note 10, at 894–95, and “it is error to suppose that every 
case . . . which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance,” id. at 895 (quoting Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Similarly, when the court defers to 
a presidential maneuver, like the assertion of state-secrets privileges, rather than a congressional one, the 
Executive effectively determines whether a Bivens right of action should exist.  Kiik, supra note 12, at 
1969. 
39  See Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22, at 121–22, 133–36. 
40  See id. at 121; see also Margulies, supra note 12, at 20203, 220 (proposing that courts view the 
availability of a Bivens remedy as the “default position” and place the burden on officials to show that 
they implemented proportional alternative methods when confronted with similar situations proximate in 
time to the one at issue in the lawsuit). 
41  553 U.S. 723 (2008).   
42  Boumediene can be read to reject any per se rules against the application of constitutional protec-
tions to noncitizens abroad.  Jules Lobel, Extraordinary Rendition and the Constitution: The Case of 
Maher Arar, 28 REV. LITIG. 479, 493 (2008).  Others have argued more generally that the Supreme 
Court’s recent habeas corpus jurisprudence points toward the extension of constitutional rights, and Bi-
vens relief, to extraterritorial detainees.  E.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 846–47.  
43  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 754. 
44  Lobel, supra note 42, at 494 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 727).  The Boumediene decision can 
be read to reject broadly the circumscription of constitutional rights based on geography, an approach 
that led to the “legal black hole[s]” that proved so tempting to the Bush Administration in establishing a 
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Indeed, in April 2009, a district judge ruled that three aliens detained at 
Bagram in Afghanistan were entitled to habeas review.45  Following Bou-
mediene, the court examined the United States’ “objective degree of con-
trol” at the site of detention46 and found that a Status of Forces Agreement 
and a lease afforded the U.S. government “near-total operational control.”47  
The court acknowledged that the bases for its finding would apply to nearly 
any U.S.-run military facility in the world.48  Although the D.C. Circuit later 
reversed the holding,49 it did so not by invalidating the Boumediene “objec-
tive degree of control” test, but by reaching a different conclusion as to 
whether the facts surrounding Bagram satisfied the test.50  The opinions, 
therefore, may still foretell a Boumediene-inspired trend toward extending 
constitutional rights to detainees abroad.  This trend will allow courts to 
consider whether Bivens rights of action should be available to vindicate 
any newly extended rights.  To date, courts and commentators have made 
much ado about the availability of Bivens rights of action and the special 
factors that might preclude them,51 but they have paid little attention to the 
                                                                                                                           
foreign detention scheme after September 11, 2001.  See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION 
FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 195–97 (2009). 
Long before the GWOT, others suggested that constitutional restraints should attach to federal offi-
cials’ actions rather than to their locations.  See, e.g., John A. Ragosta, Aliens Abroad: Principles for the 
Application of Constitutional Limitations to Federal Action, 17 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 287, 293–94 
(1985) (“In applying the Constitution abroad . . . it is always a U.S. citizen—a government official—
who is being controlled by the Constitution.  Since the Court’s decision in Reid v. Covert [354 U.S. 1 
(1957)], it is clear that these officials are controlled, at home and abroad, by constitutional limitations.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
45  Al Maqaleh v. Gates (al Maqaleh I), 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–09 (2009), rev’d, al Maqaleh II, 
605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  Heeding Boumediene, the court analyzed: 
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; (3) the adequacy of the process 
through which the status determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of apprehension; (5) 
the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petition-
er’s entitlement to the writ. 
Id. at 215.  The court also considered the “length of a petitioner’s detention without adequate review,” 
which it thought more tacitly informed the Boumediene Court.  Id. at 216.  
46  Id. at 221.   
47  Id. at 222.  U.S. personnel may enter and exit Afghanistan without passports, and U.S. vehicles, 
imports, and exports are exempt from taxation, regulation, and inspection.  Id. 
48  Id.  
49  Al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
50  Id. at 88.  The court emphasized that “Afghanistan remains a theater of active military combat” 
and listed facts contrary to any exclusive U.S. control.  Id.  It concluded that al Maqaleh I’s application 
of the test would make habeas relief available to prisoners at any U.S. military facility in the world and 
refused to adopt such a broad application of the Boumediene test.  Id. at 95. 
51  See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563–65 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 3409 (2010); Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 529–30 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); 
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1019–25 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Brown, supra note 10; Eugene Konto-
rovich, Liability Rules for Constitutional Rights: The Case of Mass Detentions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 755 
(2004); Margulies, supra note 12; Pfander & Baltmanis, supra note 22; Stephen I. Vladeck, National 
Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010); Vladeck, supra note 38; Kiik, 
supra note 12. 
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defense that stands to eviscerate any hard-fought victory in the availability 
of Bivens rights of action: qualified immunity.  
B. The Defense of Qualified Immunity 
Most executive officials enjoy qualified immunity from suit,52 which 
prevents fear of personal liability and costly litigation from impairing their 
effectiveness.53  Qualified immunity exempts government officials from 
personal liability where their actions are “reasonable in light of current 
American law.”54  Thus, in order to be protected by qualified immunity, of-
ficials must be aware of fundamental constitutional rights and act accor-
dingly.55  A government actor’s claim that he was “just following orders” 
will not immunize him.56  While courts require awareness of the law, they 
do not expect officials to anticipate new extensions of rights or changes in 
the law “with a prescience that escapes even the most able scholars, law-
yers, and judges.”57  As the Court recently explained, “Qualified immunity 
gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken 
judgments about open legal questions.”58  The qualified immunity tests of 
the last four decades account for these understandings. 
1. The Pre-Saucier Merits Bypass.—The judicial test for qualified 
immunity has evolved significantly over the last forty-four years.  What be-
gan in 1967 as a subjective test of the official’s “good faith” belief in the 
constitutionality of his actions59 has evolved into a purely objective test.  
Now, under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, qualified immunity protects officials 
whose conduct “does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”60  This re-
trospective standard can be read to not require any adjudication of the 
 
52  The President, judges, and prosecutors, when engaging in prosecutorial conduct, enjoy absolute 
immunity from suits for money damages.  Other government officials are protected by qualified immun-
ity.  See David Rudovsky, Saucier v. Katz: Qualified Immunity as a Doctrine of Dilution of Constitu-
tional Rights, in WE DISSENT: TALKING BACK TO THE REHNQUIST COURT 172, 173 (Michael Avery ed., 
2009).  The courts recognize an “interchangeability of immunity precedents between § 1983 suits . . . 
and Bivens actions.”  Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 654 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  This 
Comment, therefore, discusses qualified immunity precedent and scholarship from both types of suits. 
53  JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION 208, 210 (2006). 
54  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 646 (majority opinion). 
55  See id. at 649–50 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
56  Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 715, 788 (2006). 
57  Anderson, 483 U.S. at 649–50 n.2.  Some commentators, however, argue that Bivens claims 
themselves demand too high a degree of foresight from officials.  See Margulies, supra note 12, at 199 
(“Graced with the omniscience of hindsight, courts and juries overestimate officials’ ability to correctly 
decide whom to arrest, detain, or interrogate.”). 
58  Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
59  See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967). 
60  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified 
Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 237–38 (2006). 
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underlying constitutionality of the official’s conduct, implying that rights 
adjudication is unnecessary in qualified immunity analyses.61   
A few years after Harlow, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth 
implied that courts were not required to reach the merits of the alleged con-
stitutional violation before granting qualified immunity on the basis that the 
right allegedly violated was not clearly established at the time of the offend-
ing conduct.62  Because of this implied discretion to avoid deciding the me-
rits, in the years after Mitchell, courts often opted to forego the merits 
decision.  In 1989 and 1990, lower courts avoided the constitutional ques-
tion in more than twenty-five percent of constitutional tort cases involving a 
qualified immunity defense.63 
In Siegert v. Gilley,64 the Supreme Court sought to slow the growing 
trend of constitutional avoidance.  As was common at the time, the lower 
court in Siegert had skipped over the question of whether the plaintiff had 
stated any cognizable constitutional claim.65  In overturning the court of ap-
peals decision, the Supreme Court explained that “[a] necessary concomi-
tant to the determination of whether the constitutional right asserted by a 
plaintiff is ‘clearly established’ at the time the defendant acted is the deter-
mination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation of a constitutional 
right at all.”66  While pre-Siegert cases had given courts the choice of ad-
dressing or bypassing the constitutional question with a dose of skepticism 
that such an inquiry need be undertaken, Siegert gave them this choice with 
a light nudge towards adjudicating the constitutional merits. 
The ten-year period after Siegert reveals the approach taken by lower 
courts in qualified immunity analyses when the Supreme Court recom-
mends, but does not mandate, merits-first sequencing.  Despite the Siegert 
Court’s tacit encouragement, the lower courts were reluctant to decide the 
constitutional merits first, and seldom did so.67  Their reluctance continued 
 
61  See Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 874 
(2005). 
62  472 U.S. 511, 52728 (1985) (reasoning that a decision about the official’s qualified immunity 
addresses a claim that is “conceptually distinct from the merits” and prohibits the plaintiff’s Bivens 
claim from going forward); accord Chen, supra note 60, at 241.  
63  Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis, 36 PEPP. L. 
REV. 667, 670 (2009). 
64  See 500 U.S. 226 (1991). 
65  See Healy, supra note 61, at 876–77. 
66  Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232. 
67  See Paul W. Hughes, Not a Failed Experiment: Wilson-Saucier Sequencing and the Articulation 
of Constitutional Rights, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 401, 411 (2009); Sam Kamin, An Article III Defense of 
Merits-First Decisionmaking in Civil Rights Litigation: The Continued Viability of Saucier v. Katz, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 53, 70 (2008).  But see Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, Note, An Empirical 
Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 523, 531 (2010) (arguing that it is inaccurate to classify the pre-Saucier period as a phase of dis-
cretionary sequencing because of the lower courts’ significant confusion about their discretion at that 
time). 
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even after the Supreme Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, indicated 
that a “better approach” would be to adjudicate the constitutional claims be-
fore reaching the “clearly established” prong of the test68 and, in Wilson v. 
Layne, reiterated the benefits of deciding the constitutional question first.69  
The circuit courts split on whether Siegert, Sacramento, and Wilson really 
demanded merits-first analysis.70 
2. Saucier and Merits-First Analysis.—In 2001, the Supreme Court 
unambiguously settled the debate in the lower courts about whether they 
had to address a claim’s constitutional merits before proceeding to the 
“clearly established” inquiry.  In Saucier v. Katz, the Court clarified no 
fewer than five times that a court presented with a qualified immunity de-
fense must consider the constitutional question first and the “clearly estab-
lished” question second.71  Determining the existence or nonexistence of a 
constitutional right first would aid the case-to-case development of the law72 
and lead courts to define more specifically the constitutional rights at is-
sue.73  If a court simply jumped to the “clearly established” inquiry, “[t]he 
law might be deprived of this explanation.”74  After Saucier, lower courts’ 
use of the mandatory merits-first Saucier sequence jumped to nearly ninety-
nine percent.75 
What is most important to recognize about mandatory Saucier se-
quencing is that it permits courts to find that a constitutional right exists, 
but then to find that the government official is nonetheless entitled to quali-
 
68  523 U.S. 833, 841–42 n.5 (1998). 
69  526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999). 
70  Overall, the lower appellate courts still skipped the constitutional question in twenty-six percent 
of qualified immunity decisions.  Hughes, supra note 67, at 424.  The district courts, at this time, by-
passed the constitutional merits in thirteen percent of qualified immunity decisions.  See Leong, supra 
note 63, at 711. 
71  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001) (“[T]he first inquiry must be whether a constitutional 
right would have been violated on the facts alleged . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (“[T]he requisites of a 
qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence.” (emphasis added)); id. at 201 (“A 
court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold ques-
tion: . . . do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” (emphasis add-
ed)); id. (“This must be the initial inquiry.” (emphasis added)); id. at 207 (“Our instruction 
to . . . concentrate at the outset on the definition of the constitutional right and to determine whether, on 
the facts alleged, a constitutional violation could be found is important.” (emphasis added)).  
72  See id. at 201. 
73  See id. at 207. 
74  Id. at 201.   
75  See Hughes, supra note 67, at 424; see also Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 67, at 538 (“[T]he 
shift to mandatory sequencing corresponded to a decrease in the frequency with which appellate courts 
skipped the substantive constitutional question.” (citing Hughes, supra note 67, at 418, 424)).  In 2005, 
appellate courts declined to resolve the constitutional merits of the plaintiff’s claim before proceeding to 
qualified immunity in only two cases.  Hughes, supra note 67, at 424.  In 2006 and 2007, courts fol-
lowed the mandatory Saucier sequence approximately ninety-five percent of the time.  Leong, supra 
note 63, at 711 tbls.3 & 4.  The courts that still occasionally deviated from Saucier sequencing did not 
articulate any clear basis for doing so.  See id. at 682.  
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fied immunity because the constitutional right was not clearly established at 
the time the official is alleged to have violated it.  In this way, a court may 
formally recognize and announce a novel constitutional right without pu-
nishing an official who had no notice of such a right when he acted.   
3. Pearson v. Callahan: Back to the Future?.—From 2001 to 2008, 
the Supreme Court heard, but did not heed, critics of Saucier sequencing.76  
In March 2008, however, upon granting review of a Tenth Circuit decision 
regarding the “consent-once-removed” doctrine,77 the Supreme Court took 
the unusual step of directing the parties to brief and argue whether the 
Saucier decision should be overruled.78  On January 21, 2009, the Supreme 
Court officially overruled Saucier and reinstated discretion to omit the con-
stitutional rights inquiry from qualified immunity analyses.79 
Importantly, the Court wholeheartedly agreed with the Saucier Court 
that the merits-first sequence promotes constitutional development.80  It 
proposed, however, that the articulation of constitutional rights need not re-
ly on qualified immunity analyses in Bivens and § 1983 claims.81  Suits for 
injunctive relief against government officials, suits against municipalities, 
and motions to suppress evidence in criminal trials would provide alterna-
tive venues for constitutional elaboration82 because they all necessarily re-
quire plaintiffs to litigate the applicability and scope of a constitutional 
right.  The Court emphasized that, where a Bivens plaintiff’s claim is un-
likely to arise in an alternative arena for constitutional development, the 
two-part test would remain “especially valuable.”83   
The Court’s confidence that the lower courts would exercise their dis-
cretion to undertake the constitutional rights inquiry based on its reminder 
that the two-step process is “often appropriate” and sometimes “especially 
valuable” betrays the Court’s short memory.  Scholars have already pre-
 
76  See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 817–18 (2009) (citing Supreme Court concurrences and 
dissents in which the opinion author expressed doubt, or outright disapproval, for a mandatory Saucier 
sequence); see also supra Part IV.A. (discussing common criticisms of the Saucier approach). 
77  Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 814.  The Tenth Circuit case addressed whether a member of a narcotics 
task force had violated Callahan’s Fourth Amendment rights when he conducted a warrantless search of 
Callahan’s property based on the fact that Callahan had given an informant permission to enter.  See 
Callahan v. Millard Cnty., 494 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 
808 (2009). 
78  Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008) (mem.). 
79  Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818. 
80  Id.  Also, in some circumstances a court may not be able to answer the “clearly established” ques-
tion until it has identified the precise constitutional right involved.  Id.  
81  Id. at 821–22. 
82  Id.  Suits against municipalities could serve to develop constitutional law because municipal ac-
tors have no qualified immunity defense.  Id. at 822.  This Comment does not discuss suits against mu-
nicipalities as possible alternatives to develop detainee rights because local and municipal governments 
are not responsible for the GWOT detainees’ detention, treatment, or rendition, so these suits are not vi-
able options for recovery.  
83  Id. at 818.   
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dicted a post-Pearson reversion to the qualified immunity jurisprudence of 
the 1990s that necessitated the Saucier sequence in the first place.84  Lower 
courts, they argue, will find skipping the constitutional question to be the 
path of least resistance.85  This presents a nearly insurmountable obstacle for 
GWOT plaintiffs seeking reparations through Bivens.86  Despite the history 
of the qualified immunity analysis, the Pearson Court decided to rely heavi-
ly on the lower courts’ willingness to develop constitutional law by identi-
fying claims involving constitutional questions that were unlikely to 
develop through other types of suits and to apply the Saucier sequence in 
those cases.87  As the next Part demonstrates, GWOT Bivens actions square-
ly fit within these criteria.  Yet the lower courts have not consistently rec-
ognized the need for a two-step qualified immunity analysis, and scholars 
and the Supreme Court have failed to engage in the examination of other 
possible rights of action as applied to GWOT Bivens claims that would re-
veal the need for Saucier sequencing in these instances.   
Indeed, in its recent Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (al-Kidd III) opinion—the first 
GWOT Bivens decision after Pearson—the Supreme Court neither con-
demned nor applauded the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply a merits-first 
analysis.88  Although Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Camreta v. Greene, 
handed down just five days before al-Kidd III, had reemphasized the gener-
al availability of alternative causes of action to elaborate constitutional is-
sues,89 and although the Ninth Circuit’s al-Kidd II opinion had expressly 
identified al-Kidd’s Bivens claim as one for which Saucier sequencing re-
 
84  See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 67, at 404 (“Either abandoning or relaxing Wilson-Saucier would 
lead to significant constitutional stagnation.”).  But see Sobolski & Steinberg, supra note 67, at 527 (ar-
guing that post-Pearson lower court behavior cannot be predicted based on pre-Saucier trends because 
Pearson conferred sequencing discretion without ambiguity).  
85  See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. 
REV. 115, 131 (“Saucier’s benefits are forward-looking and systemic, while its costs are felt here and 
now.  Busy trial judges who see a short route to decision on qualified immunity will often be unwilling 
to come to grips with the merits, even though the failure to do so may be costly in the long run.”). 
86  But cf. Reinert, supra note 13, at 843 (reporting, without respect to whether cases were in or out 
of the GWOT context, that, in his sample, qualified immunity accounted for fewer dismissals than me-
rits decisions, frivolity, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies).  Professor Reinert noted that this 
surprising finding that qualified immunity played only a minor role in the overall dismissal rate for Bi-
vens claims could reflect “most troublingly . . . that the prospect of qualified immunity deters lawyers 
from accepting the most difficult Bivens cases, thus operating as an unseen thumb on the scale in favor 
of maintaining the legal status quo.”  Id. at 844. 
87  Professor Jeffries has more broadly and perhaps more explicitly asserted that courts must diffe-
rentiate their qualified immunity analyses based on the dependence of the right at hand on suits for mon-
ey damages.  See Jeffries, supra note 85, at 13236.   
88  Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).  The Court primarily reiterated the principles it developed in 
Pearson: that lower courts have discretion regarding a one- versus two-step approach to qualified im-
munity analysis and that they should “think carefully before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to re-
solve difficult and novel questions of constitutional or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect 
on the outcome of the case.’”  Id. at 2080 (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818). 
89  See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2043–44 (2011) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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mained “especially valuable,”90 the Supreme Court’s opinion did not discuss 
those alternatives in the GWOT Bivens context.  Had the Court undertaken 
this inquiry, it likely would have identified GWOT Bivens actions as a cate-
gory of qualified immunity litigation for which the Saucier sequence re-
mains essential. 
II. WHY PEARSON’S RELIANCE ON NON-BIVENS SUITS IS MISPLACED FOR 
GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR DETAINEES 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. military, intelligence, and 
law enforcement officials captured and detained thousands of U.S. citizens 
and alien “enemy combatants.”  Detained U.S. citizens at times were 
housed in military brigs91 and prisons.92  Aliens who were already on U.S. 
soil, whether legally or illegally, often were detained domestically until 
they were cleared for deportation.93  Aliens captured abroad were held at 
Bagram, Abu Ghraib, and other secret “black sites.”94  Some of them found 
themselves at Guantánamo Bay.  Many detainees have been released or, 
more recently, charged with crimes for which they will be tried by military 
commissions or Article III courts.95  The number of detainees at Guantána-
mo Bay has dwindled to fewer than two hundred96 as President Obama has 
continued efforts initiated by President Bush to arrange for the transfer of 
detainees to other countries. 
Closing Guantánamo, however, will not end the detention of citizens 
and aliens in the United States and abroad in connection with the GWOT.  
In 2008, the detainee population in Iraq was approximately 26,000, much 
larger than that of Guantánamo.97  Detainees also remain at other foreign 
detention sites.98  For a long time, detention will be part of U.S. efforts to 
neutralize terrorist threats to the United States.99  The questions become the 
following: What kind of detention program may the President implement to 
 
90  Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949, 964 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074. 
91  See, e.g., Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1013 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
92  See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2079. 
93  See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 255 (D. Conn. 2008).  
94  See generally James E. Pfander, The Limits of Habeas Jurisdiction and the Global War on Ter-
ror, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 498 n.2 (2006) (collecting news articles and reports of foreign “black 
sites”). 
95  See infra note 141.  
96  BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., BROOKINGS INST., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE 
GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS CASES AS LAWMAKING 4 (2010), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf. 
97  WITTES, supra note †, at 160. 
98  See id.  
99  See id. at 153 (“[T]he United States will end up holding some number of Al Qaeda and Taliban 
fighters outside of the criminal justice system for some time to come—and we hope to capture more.  So 
if the military closes the detention operation at Guantánamo, it will simply have to re-create it some-
where else.”). 
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accomplish these disablement and intelligence-gathering goals?  In the 
wake of the Guantánamo Bay detentions, which have sparked ire in the 
United States and the international community, what is constitutionally ap-
propriate? 
The answer to these questions is most likely to come from Bivens ac-
tions brought by detainees.  The qualified immunity defense to these claims, 
when decided based on a Saucier merits-first process, serves an important 
notice-giving function without unfairly penalizing officials for failing to 
predict the future of constitutional law.  Forced to address the underlying 
constitutional right that the plaintiff claims was violated, a court must di-
rectly determine principles, and possibly limitations, that will guide execu-
tive officials in future conduct.  If the court finds that the Constitution does 
in fact provide an individual with a right and then clarifies this constitution-
al right, the President and his officials will know to avoid conduct that 
would violate that right.  In this way, the Executive Branch can escape fu-
ture litigation, public outcry, and foreign relations debacles.  Where the 
court denies the existence of the asserted constitutional right or finds that it 
was not violated, the President and his officials learn that they need not he-
sitate when confronted with similar circumstances in the future.   
Unfortunately for both the Executive Branch and GWOT victims, 
Pearson stands to stanch any flow of constitutional guidance that would 
come out of two-step qualified immunity analyses.  The Pearson Court did 
not consider that the constitutional rights of GWOT victims fit into the dan-
gerous category of being unlikely to arise in suits in which qualified im-
munity defenses are not available.100  And the Court failed to address this 
danger even in the GWOT Bivens case that it decided this past Term.101 
This Part demonstrates why the alternative suits that the Pearson Court 
entrusted to continue the march of constitutional law development are un-
likely mechanisms for the adjudication of constitutional issues underlying 
executive detention schemes in the GWOT.   
A. Suits for Injunctive or Declaratory Relief 
In assuaging concerns that one-step qualified immunity analyses would 
lead to constitutional stagnation, the Pearson Court pointed to motions for 
injunctive and declaratory relief as alternative legal procedures to facilitate 
the elaboration of constitutional rules.102  While these legal procedures gen-
erally can serve that purpose, they are unlikely to do so for GWOT victims.   
 
100  Indeed, the Pearson Court had no reason to recognize the impact of its ruling on GWOT detai-
nee cases since its facts did not implicate those types of plaintiffs or their Bivens claims. 
101 See al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
102  Although the Pearson Court did not explicitly mention declaratory judgments, the logic applying 
to suits for injunctive relief applies to declaratory judgments as well.  See infra notes 12425. 
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Injunctions come in many forms.103  As the Pearson Court recognized, 
a motion for a preliminary injunction can lead the deciding court to adjudi-
cate constitutional rights questions.104  The first element a plaintiff must 
show on a motion for a preliminary injunction is a substantial likelihood of 
success on the merits.105  To make this determination, a court evaluates 
whether the conduct the plaintiff seeks to enjoin would constitute a viola-
tion of her rights.  Herein lies the reason for the Pearson Court’s assurance 
that, absent constitutional development in civil rights damages actions, or-
ders for and against injunctions will still advance constitutional elaboration.  
But this assurance rings hollow in the GWOT detainee context.106   
GWOT detainees have filed preliminary injunctions seeking to enjoin 
certain confinement conditions,107 torture,108 military commission proceed-
ings,109 transfer to countries where they may be tortured or prosecuted,110 
and even force-feeding during a hunger strike.111  But, courts have granted 
very few injunctions that implicate constitutional rights.112  When they have, 
 
103  See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7 (1978) (describing preventive, reparative, 
and structural injunctions, as well as interlocutory versus final injunctions, and mandatory versus prohi-
bitory injunctions). 
104  See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 821–22 (2009). 
105  O.K. v. Bush, 377 F. Supp. 2d 102, 111 (D.D.C. 2005).  In addition, plaintiffs must show that 
they will suffer irreparable harm if the anticipated conduct continues, that other parties will not be 
harmed by the injunction, and that public interests support the injunction.  Id.  Courts must balance the 
plaintiff’s arguments as to each of the four elements.  Id. 
Similarly, a court may grant a motion for a permanent injunction only when it determines that the 
plaintiff has suffered an irreparable injury, that other legal remedies are inadequate to compensate for 
that injury, that the balance between the hardships on the plaintiff and those on the defendant warrants 
an equitable remedy, and that a permanent injunction will not disserve public interests.  Ebay Inc. v. 
Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).  A plaintiff seeking an injunction to protect her con-
stitutional rights would have to demonstrate a constitutional injury in the first prong of the test. 
106  Some of the problems with injunctions as mechanisms for constitutional elaboration are not li-
mited to the GWOT context.  As Professor Jeffries notes, most victims of constitutional torts have no 
notice that a constitutional violation is going to occur, and many would encounter standing limitations.  
Jeffries, supra note 85, at 13233. 
107  See, e.g., In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 570 F. Supp. 2d 13, 15 (D.D.C. 2008); Paracha 
v. Bush, 374 F. Supp. 2d 118, 119 (D.D.C. 2005).  
108  See O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 103. 
109  See, e.g., Al Sharbi v. Bush, 430 F. Supp. 2d 1, 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Hicks v. Bush, 397 F. Supp. 2d 
36, 37 (D.D.C. 2005).  
110  See, e.g., Belbacha v. Bush, 520 F.3d 452, 454 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Sliti v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 
116, 117 (D.D.C. 2005).  Detainees have also demanded advance notice of such transfers.  See, e.g., 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010); Mammar 
v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 77, 78 (D.D.C. 2005); O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 111; Al-Anazi v. Bush, 370 F. 
Supp. 2d 188, 189 (D.D.C. 2005). 
111  See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 596 F. Supp. 2d 111, 114 (D.D.C. 2009). 
112  Aside from the barrage of motions for injunctions compelling notice before transfer out of Guan-
tánamo, detainees have succeeded on motions for injunctions in only four instances, and only two of the 
injunctions asserted any judicial opinion as to the detainee’s rights.  See Adem v. Bush, 425 F. Supp. 2d 
7, 8 (D.D.C. 2006) (compelling compliance with a protective order requiring that the detainee have 
access to counsel); Al-Joudi v. Bush, 406 F. Supp. 2d 13, 23 (D.D.C. 2005) (compelling the detainee’s 
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they have avoided the constitutional underpinnings, often due to the separa-
tion-of-powers implications of a judicial order restraining military or na-
tional security activities.  In 2005, a Guantánamo Bay detainee sought a 
preliminary injunction against his interrogation, torture, and other cruel and 
degrading treatment.113  The court denied the detainee any injunction against 
interrogation, finding no law for the “extraordinary notion” that a court 
could prohibit federal executive officers from interrogating captives from 
live military hostilities,114 especially in light of military officials’ assertions 
that barring these interrogations could threaten national security.115  While 
the detainee’s motion for an injunction against torture received more scruti-
ny,116 the court still avoided deciding whether the detainee had any constitu-
tional right to be free from torture and where the Constitution would draw 
the line between acceptable interrogation and impermissible torture in this 
situation.117  The court held that such allegations still did not warrant the 
“exceptional remedy of a preliminary injunction” against the U.S. military 
in this setting.118  Although the court could conceive of facts sufficiently ex-
treme to warrant a determination of whether officials had violated whatever 
Fifth Amendment due process rights a detainee may have, these allegations 
were not enough.119  Unless the petitioner convincingly alleged conditions 
so severe as to constitute an imminent threat to his health, “the Court 
[would] not insert itself into the day-to-day operations of Guantánamo.”120 
The court was unwilling to exert prospective control over the military 
operations of executive officers during wartime.121  This is, undoubtedly, a 
                                                                                                                           
access to counsel during a hunger strike).  The other two injunctions merely stayed the detainees’ mili-
tary commissions while the Supreme Court was deciding whether those commissions were lawful in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).  See Al Sharbi, 430 F. Supp. 2d at 1–2; Hicks, 397 F. Supp. 
2d at 44–45.   
In the notice-of-transfer context, detainees have asserted two primary bases for requiring notice be-
fore being transferred from Guantánamo Bay to some other nation: (1) that such transfers would “unlaw-
fully circumvent review of [their] pending habeas petitions” and (2) that such transfer, and the torture 
that allegedly would follow, would violate their rights under international conventions, namely the Ge-
neva Conventions, the Convention Against Torture, and the International Covenant on Civil Rights.  See 
Robert M. Chesney, Leaving Guantánamo: The Law of International Detainee Transfers, 40 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 657, 667–69 (2006).  As of 2006, D.C. district judges had ruled in favor of the detainees on notice-
of-transfer injunctions twenty-seven out of thirty-four times, thus requiring the government to give at 
least thirty days notice before transferring a detainee out of Guantánamo Bay.  Id. at 668. 
113  O.K., 377 F. Supp. 2d at 111. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. at 112. 
116  Id.  The detainee’s torture allegations included short-shackling and being used as a “human 
mop” to soak up urine and pine solvent.  Id. 
117  Id. at 113. 
118  Id. at 112. 
119  Id.  
120  Id. at 114. 
121  See id. (“This Court is not equipped or authorized to assume the broader roles of a congressional 
oversight committee or a superintendent of the operations of a military base.”). 
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legitimate concern given the nature of injunctive relief.  If an official vi-
olates the terms of an injunction, the issuing judge may hold the official in 
contempt, which may include a fine or imprisonment, until the official 
complies with the injunction.122  Imprisonment could completely incapaci-
tate executive officials during wartime, a restriction that likely would pre-
vent them from protecting national security interests.  The consequences of 
an injunction on government operations, therefore, are far greater than an 
obligation to pay damages for bygone conduct after wartime exigencies 
have cooled.123   
This same argument against relying on injunctions to develop the con-
stitutional rights of GWOT victims applies to motions for declaratory relief.  
A declaratory judgment pronounces the legality (sometimes the constitutio-
nality) of the defendant’s anticipated conduct.124  While conduct not in con-
formity with a declaratory judgment does not lead directly to penalties, the 
official’s nonadherence entitles the plaintiff to an injunction to enforce the 
declaratory judgment, thereby activating the same potential conduct-
restricting penalties for noncompliance that exist with an injunction.125 
In O.K. v. Bush,126 the court itself seemed skeptical about the value of 
injunctive relief to remedy harms caused by torture, mistreatment, and un-
justified detention.  The petitioner’s treatment at Guantánamo had been at 
its worst eighteen months earlier, and the petitioner had not offered any 
evidence that it would rise to that level again.127  Without saying so, the 
court seemed to consider the petitioner’s claims effectively moot.  Protec-
tion for the O.K. detainee going forward seemed an inappropriate remedy 
for the past harms.128  That said, the court did not believe that federal courts 
should condone the petitioner’s mistreatment.129  Clearly, in this type of 
scenario, damages for past violations are preferable to an injunction pre-
venting future conduct that the Executive Branch claims will not occur.   
Injunctions and declaratory judgments are also ineffective remedies for 
wartime detainees because of the Executive Branch’s historical and con-
tinuing ability to sidestep impending judicial decisions.  Since injunctions 
and declaratory judgments only apply to future actions, an executive official 
seeking to evade a constitutional ruling can merely shift or cease his chal-
 
122  MICHAEL L. WELLS & THOMAS A. EATON, CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES: A REFERENCE GUIDE 
TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 186 (2002). 
123  See id. at 188 (“The consequences of granting prospective relief may be far greater than the sim-
ple obligation to pay damages, as government may have to change its operations in important ways.”). 
124  See Archibald Cox, The Independence of the Judiciary: History and Purposes, 21 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 565, 573 n.27 (1995) (collecting cases adjudicating constitutional rights through motions for decla-
ratory relief). 
125  See WELLS & EATON, supra note 122, at 186. 
126  377 F. Supp. 2d 102.  
127  Id. at 112–14. 
128  See id. at 114. 
129  See id. 
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lenged behavior.  For example, when the Supreme Court undertook consti-
tutional review of the Japanese internments during World War II in Kore-
matsu v. United States,130 President Roosevelt nearly mooted the issue the 
day before the Supreme Court issued its opinion by announcing the closure 
of the camps.131   
Executive avoidance has become a familiar phenomenon in the GWOT 
in two contexts: (1) the Executive Branch’s decision to house GWOT detai-
nees at offshore sites to evade judicial review and (2) the Executive 
Branch’s last-minute maneuvering to evade pending judicial decisions 
about the legality of certain detention and treatment policies.132  When U.S. 
courts started reviewing executive detentions, the Executive Branch began 
mooting issues before the courts could decide them.  A few examples suf-
fice to demonstrate the phenomenon.  The unexpected transfer of detainee 
Jose Padilla out of military custody mooted an appeal to the Supreme 
Court133 from the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Padilla v. Hanft holding that 
he was lawfully detained under the President’s congressionally authorized 
Authorization for Use of Military Force powers.134  When an American citi-
zen who had been arrested, detained, and interrogated in Saudi Arabia and 
later flown back to the United States to await trial135 filed a habeas corpus 
petition, and a court ordered discovery into U.S. officials’ role in his foreign 
detention, the government mooted the petition and the order by transferring 
him back stateside and indicting him on criminal charges.136  In doing so, 
the government may have avoided a ruling extending rights to detainees 
held abroad or transferred abroad by the United States.   
 
130  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
131  Stephen I. Vladeck, The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the Necessity/Legality Paradox, 
43 U. RICH. L. REV. 893, 917–18 (2009) (book review). 
132  The choice to call these U.S. efforts a “war” may have constituted another form of executive 
avoidance.  By calling the U.S. response “war,” President Bush ensured that the most recent law regard-
ing alien detention rights was Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950), a World War II case that, at 
more than fifty years old, was woefully out of date in terms of available technologies, cultural beliefs, 
and international conceptions of human rights.  Cf. RAUSTIALA, supra note 44, at 198–200 (“The war 
against Al Qaeda certainly differed from prior wars . . . .”).  Otherwise, more recent cases about the de-
tention of Haitians at Guantánamo Bay might have constrained military activities there.  See id. at 199
200.  For examples of executive-avoidance maneuvers in the GWOT, see Joseph Landau, Muscular 
Procedure: Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 674 n.70 
(2009). 
133  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1038 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
134  Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386 (4th Cir. 2005).  When the Government first petitioned to transfer 
Padilla to a criminal court and vacate the Fourth Circuit’s decision, Padilla was lawfully detained—
although his petition for certiorari on the question was then pending before the Supreme Court.  The 
Fourth Circuit perceived the transfer as an avoidance maneuver and denied the transfer and vacatur on 
that very basis.  See id. 
135  United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210, 221–25 (4th Cir. 2008). 
136  Stephen I. Vladeck, The Problem of Jurisdictional Non-precedent, 44 TULSA L. REV. 587, 611 
(2009).  
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The government’s evasion of judicial review of its detention programs 
is most evident in its recent effort to evacuate Guantánamo Bay in the wake 
of extensions of constitutional habeas corpus rights there and consequent 
judicial inquiries into the evidence used to justify detentions.  Between 
2002 and 2008, the U.S. government released or transferred more than four 
hundred Guantánamo Bay detainees either because they no longer posed 
threats or because other countries were willing to accept them.137  In the 
year after the Supreme Court’s Rasul v. Bush decision in 2004, which held 
that the D.C. courts could entertain detainees’ habeas corpus petitions, cus-
todial transfers increased while outright releases decreased.138  Since then, 
the U.S. government has further increased the pace at which it transfers 
Guantánamo detainees.139  Given the increasing number of opportunities for 
judicial review in the post-Boumediene realm, this transfer program can be 
viewed as another executive avoidance measure.140  Executive avoidance in 
the GWOT detention context demonstrates the nonviability of motions for 
injunctions and declaratory relief as venues for constitutional development.  
B. Motions to Suppress in Criminal Prosecutions 
Contrary to the Pearson Court’s assurances, motions to suppress evi-
dence at criminal trials will not prevent constitutional stagnation of GWOT 
victims’ rights.  Constitutional law develops whenever a criminal defendant 
argues that evidence offered against him was obtained unconstitutionally, 
for example in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from un-
lawful searches and seizures or his Fifth Amendment right against com-
pelled self-incrimination.  However, many GWOT suspects do not have the 
opportunity to face criminal prosecutions in Article III courts, where these 
rights are well established.141  
 
137  Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 643, 644 (2008).  
138  Chesney, supra note 112, at 660–65.  There were seventeen custodial transfers between January 
2002 and June 2004, as compared to the fifty-one that occurred between July 2004 and July 2005.  Id. 
139  In the three-and-a-half years covered by Professor Chesney’s review (January 2002 to July 
2005), there were sixty-eight custodial transfers.  Id.  Between January 2007 and March 2010, the U.S. 
government transferred approximately 210 Guantánamo detainees to other countries.  See The Guantá-
namo Docket—Timeline, N.Y. TIMES, http://projects.nytimes.com/guantanamo/timeline (last visited 
Aug. 21, 2011) (providing a chronological list of transfers and how many detainees were transferred on 
each occasion).   
140  Increased pressure from the international community and President Obama’s presidential cam-
paign promises to close Guantánamo undoubtedly also have motivated the rush to close Guantánamo.  
See Senator Barack Obama, The War We Need to Win, Address at the Woodrow Wilson Int’l Ctr. for 
Scholars (Aug. 1, 2006), available at http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
barackobamawilsoncenter.htm. 
141  For two such criminal prosecutions, see United States v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th Cir. 2008), 
and United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). 
In November 2009, President Obama announced that five Guantánamo detainees would face crimi-
nal prosecution in New York City.  Charlie Savage, U.S. to Try Avowed 9/11 Mastermind Before Civi-
lian Court in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2009, at A1.  Based on President Obama’s remarks, it 
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The trial records and facts of some of the GWOT’s most notorious tri-
als are instructive with respect to the extent of rights-protective trial proce-
dures that alleged terrorists can expect to be guaranteed.142  In United States 
v. Abu Ali, the defendant claimed the court should apply U.S. standards of 
admissibility to his statements made during questioning by foreign officials 
because that interrogation was conducted as part of a “joint venture” with 
the United States.143  Although the United States had submitted questions to 
the Saudi Mabahith to be asked during its interrogation, watched the inter-
rogation through a one-way mirror, and consulted with the Saudi Mabahith 
at the end of the interview, the district court construed “joint venture” nar-
                                                                                                                           
appeared that detainees’ eligibility for criminal prosecution would be based precisely on the likelihood 
that they would not present difficult evidentiary questions that might give rise to rulings awarding the 
detainees constitutional rights.  See Editorial, Terror on the Docket, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 2009, at 18; 
Phil Bronstein, Obama & Khalid Sheikh Mohammed: If One Branch Is Good, Two Must Be Better?, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2009, 05:58 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/phil-bronstein/obama-
khalid-sheikh-moham_b_364503.html.  The Obama Administration later withdrew its plans for “terror 
trials” in New York City.  Scott Shane & Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Drops Plan for a 9/11 Trial in New 
York City, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A1.  As of April 2011, the Administration had offered no indi-
cation that its criteria for selecting cases for Article III criminal trials would change if trials were again 
slated to proceed.  See, e.g., William J. Bennett & Seth Leibsohn, Obama Administration Learns Lesson 
on Terrorism Trials, CNN OPINION (Apr. 6, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-06/opinion/bennett.
liebsohn.trials_1_civilian-courts-obama-administration-military-commission?_s=PM:OPINION (report-
ing that the Obama Administration had decided to try Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in a military tribunal 
and offering potential reasons for the decision, including the likelihood that “[u]sing civilian courts pre-
sented all sorts of evidentiary issues, Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues” (quoting lawyers Lee Casey 
and David Rivkin)). 
Recently, the National Security Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) unsealed records of 403 
criminal prosecutions under various terror-related statutes.  NAT’L SEC. DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
STATISTICS ON UNSEALED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND TERRORISM-RELATED CONVICTIONS, 
available at http://theplumline.whorunsgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/03/March-26-2010-NSD-
Final-Statistics.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).  According to the DOJ, the prosecutions all involve of-
fenses related to international terrorism.  Id. at intro.  However, only 150 of the defendants were prose-
cuted for Category I offenses, which involve actions more commonly associated with the term 
“terrorism”: acts of terrorism against U.S. citizens abroad, use of weapons of mass destruction, provision 
of material support to terrorist organizations overseas, bombings, and receipt of military-style training 
from terrorist organizations.  Id.  The majority of the convictions relate to Category II offenses, which 
involve “fraud, immigration, firearms, drugs, false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice, as well 
as general conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371.”  Id.  Because of the secrecy of these trials to date, 
it is impossible to know the extent of rights-protective trial procedures afforded the defendants. 
142  528 F.3d 210, 227–30 (4th Cir. 2008). 
143  Id. at 228–29.  The court said: 
The “joint venture” doctrine provides that “statements elicited during overseas interrogation by 
foreign police in the absence of Miranda warnings must be suppressed whenever United States law 
enforcement agents actively participate in questioning conducted by foreign authorities.” . . .  
[The] general rule [is that] mere presence at an interrogation does not constitute the “active” or 
“substantial” participation necessary for a “joint venture,” but coordination and direction of an in-
vestigation or interrogation does.   
Id. (quoting United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 145 (2d Cir. 2003)) (citations omitted).   
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rowly and refused to suppress the evidence garnered from the interroga-
tions.144   
The uncertainty of trials, coupled with the possibility that terrorism tri-
als in Article III courts may not fully safeguard rights-protective proce-
dures, means that motions to suppress evidence are insufficiently reliable 
for the development of detainees’ constitutional rights.  Moreover, the ex-
clusionary rule has never been an avenue for vindicating certain constitu-
tional claims, such as claims that police officers used excessive force.145  
But while terror suspects as a group have had relatively few opportunities to 
test trial mechanisms for rights development, they have been able to pursue 
release through habeas corpus. 
C. Habeas Corpus 
As with the other would-be alternative legal procedures, habeas corpus 
hearings are unlikely to be effective fora for the judicial articulation of 
GWOT victims’ constitutional rights.146  Unlike the other causes of action 
discussed above, however, habeas corpus is not without value to the devel-
opment of restraints on executive detention power in the GWOT context.  
Habeas corpus claims are best viewed as valuable but limited corollaries to 
GWOT Bivens actions, ones that develop law applicable to earlier detention 
actions rather than constitutional torts.  While a writ of habeas corpus can 
impose restraints on executive power,147 thereby imposing some constitu-
tional limits and arguably developing some constitutional rules, it is not de-
signed to delineate the contours of individual constitutional rights.   
Even more importantly, those who are not detained at the time of their 
challenges have no habeas right of action at all.  Indeed, as with motions for 
 
144  United States v. Abu Ali, 395 F. Supp. 2d 338, 382 (E.D. Va. 2005).  
145  See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 85, at 135–36 (“Even within the doctrinal ambit of the Fourth 
Amendment, for example, there are constitutional violations for which exclusion of evidence is irrele-
vant.  They include what is arguably the greatest challenge in all the law of constitutional remedies—
inhibiting the abusive and excessive use of force by law enforcement.  Although such wrongs are ana-
lyzed under the Fourth Amendment, illegal seizure is not the problem, and exclusion of evidence not a 
remedy.  Under current law, the most (nearly) plausible redress for excessive force is the award of mon-
ey damages.” (footnote omitted)). 
146  While the Pearson Court did not expressly reference habeas corpus petitions as proceedings that 
can advance constitutional law, their prevalence in GWOT detainee litigation to date calls for an expla-
nation as to why those suits will not advance individual rights.  Indeed, three commentators have sug-
gested that the D.C. district courts’ numerous habeas corpus decisions constitute a form of “lawmaking” 
that could develop some detainee rights.  See WITTES ET AL., supra note 96.   
147  See, e.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Be-
ing Courageous or Politically Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 2029 (2009) (explaining that 
habeas was designed to allow the Judiciary to “monitor” the other branches); id. at 2050 (describing the 
GWOT habeas challenges as an “opportunity to announce new legal limits on the President”); cf. 
WITTES, supra note †, at 122 (“[T]he effect of habeas so far has been salutary: sustained pressure on the 
administration to move toward a fairer and more accountable system.”); Margulies, supra note 12, at 
208–09, 224, 247 (opining that habeas cannot supplant a Bivens remedy but rather must be used in tan-
dem with damages actions in order to address both executive myopia ex ante and hindsight bias ex post). 
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injunctive relief, all an executive official needs to do to eliminate the value 
of a habeas corpus claim is to release that particular detainee.  
When the Pearson Court asserted that the development of constitution-
al rights is not dependent on actions for which qualified immunity is a de-
fense, it nonetheless recognized that some questions do not often arise 
outside of such cases.  For those constitutional questions, Pearson urged the 
continued application of Saucier sequencing.148  Motions for injunctions or 
declaratory judgment and motions to suppress evidence in criminal trials 
will not guard against constitutional stagnation in the context of GWOT is-
sues.  Habeas corpus petitions are likewise unavailing for the majority of 
GWOT plaintiffs and for individual rights-development even though habeas 
corpus does provide an essential complementary cause of action for those 
presently detained and for purposes of delimiting preliminary executive de-
tention powers.  These alternative avenues for constitutional articulation are 
unlikely to provide the benefit of notice to the Executive Branch, the bene-
fits of compensation and personal vindication to injured detainees, or the 
benefits of rights-development and rights-clarification to future detainees.  
It is becoming increasingly clear that Bivens actions likely will be GWOT 
victims’149 only avenue for litigation of these questions and for constitution-
al rights development and reparations.150  Unless a merits-first qualified 
immunity analysis is applied to detainees’ Bivens claims, future GWOT vic-
tims’ rights will be almost as unclear as the rights of the first detainees to 
arrive at Guantánamo Bay were.151   
III. GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR BIVENS ACTIONS AFTER PEARSON: A VIEW 
OF THINGS TO COME 
In Pearson, the Court was careful to say that it had not eliminated the 
opportunity for courts to address the merits of the constitutional violations 
alleged by a civil rights plaintiff seeking damages.  To the contrary, the 
 
148  See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
149  GWOT detainees are not the only class of plaintiffs for whom the sole realistic cause of action is 
one for monetary damages.  See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 85, 135–36; Leong, supra note 63, 668–69; 
Rudovsky, supra note 52, at 172. 
150  Cf. Vladeck, supra note 51, at 258 (discussing the GWOT Bivens actions and explaining that “so 
long as Bivens remains on the books, it seems uniquely suited to provide a remedy in those cases in 
which no other legal or political remedy is feasible”).  Although compensation remedies may be all that 
is left, they need not be viewed as leftovers.  The Executive Branch may at times prefer paying compen-
satory damages in civil actions rather than foregoing mass detentions that confer significant security ad-
vantages or meet security necessities.  See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 797–98. 
While some commentators have correctly pointed out that “[i]n individual cases, rulings about see-
mingly mundane procedural issues . . . have accelerated the release of . . . detainees who were held at 
Guantánamo Bay,” see Landau, supra note 132, at 664, even “muscular” procedural rulings cannot re-
place constitutional pronouncements and will not serve the law-updating function that is so desperately 
needed in this context.  See infra Part IV.B; see also Landau, supra note 132, at 673 (“[P]rocedural deci-
sions often create uncertainty in the law and delay final resolutions.”).  
151  See WITTES, supra note †, at 153. 
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two-step test will be “especially valuable” when alternate fora for the plain-
tiff’s claims are unlikely to be available or are unlikely to develop the con-
stitutional law on the subject of the plaintiff’s claim.  As demonstrated in 
Part II, suits by GWOT detainees fit squarely within the class of claims 
about which the Pearson Court was concerned.  Most courts that have ruled 
on qualified immunity defenses in detainees’ Bivens actions since Pearson, 
including the Supreme Court, seem not to have recognized this. 
Much like the pre-Saucier years, the two years since Pearson have 
demonstrated that different circuits apply different standards to their deci-
sions about when to take on the constitutional question in qualified immuni-
ty decisions.  As U.S. military and defense entities continue to detain 
suspected al Qaeda and Taliban operatives, the courts’ conflicting protocols 
for addressing qualified immunity prevent the clarification of the rights of 
these detainees to the detriment of both the detainees and executive offi-
cials.  Detainees, and their attorneys, can only wonder about their rights.  
Executive officials learn nothing about the constitutionality of their deten-
tion policies that can guide their ongoing decisionmaking.   
Moreover, if the lower courts fail to address the merits of detainees’ 
Bivens claims as part of qualified immunity analyses, they indefinitely 
postpone any constitutional clarification.  The more circuits that bypass the 
constitutional merits in qualified immunity analyses, the less robust the 
body of lower court law available to the Supreme Court.  In the absence of 
percolation of novel detainee rights questions in the lower courts, the Su-
preme Court is unlikely to grant certiorari and issue a disposition that would 
inform detainees and executive officials.152   
In 2009, two circuits considered qualified immunity in GWOT detai-
nees’ Bivens actions.  Courts in the Ninth Circuit decided al-Kidd v. Ash-
croft153 and Padilla v. Yoo.154  On the other coast, the D.C. Circuit ruled on 
Rasul v. Myers,155 which the Supreme Court had remanded for consideration 
in light of Boumediene.156  The discrepant results suggest that the essential 
percolation of the constitutional issues underlying detainees’ Bivens actions 
is unlikely to occur without further guidance.157 
 
152  See Michael S. Catlett, Note, Clearly Not Established: Decisional Law and the Qualified Im-
munity Doctrine, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 1031, 1051 (2005).  See generally Todd J. Tiberi, Comment, Su-
preme Court Denials of Certiorari in Conflicts Cases: Percolation or Procrastination?, 54 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 861 (1993) (describing percolation and discussing views on its effectiveness). 
153  Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
154  Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009).  
155  Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
156  Rasul I, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.). 
157  Some scholars have noted the lower courts’ different approaches to the Bivens question rather 
than to the qualified immunity question.  See Margulies, supra note 12, at 237 (calling the difference 
between the courts’ resolutions of Arar and Iqbal and the courts’ resolutions of al-Kidd and Padilla a 
battle between “categorical deference” and “intervention”); Vladeck, supra note 51, at 268–78 (compar-
ing the courts’ approaches to the Bivens right of action in these and other GWOT cases). 
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A. A Return to Avoidance: Rasul v. Myers 
The D.C. Circuit’s one-step approach to qualified immunity analysis in 
Rasul v. Myers158 signals a return to familiar pre-Saucier constitutional 
avoidance and all but guarantees the continued uncertainty of detainee 
rights.  In 2004, four British citizens filed a complaint alleging that they 
were tortured after being captured in Afghanistan and sent to Guantánamo 
Bay.159  They claimed they were held for two years without being charged 
before they were released to return to their homes in the United Kingdom.160  
The Rasul plaintiffs claimed their detention and mistreatment, which they 
said amounted to torture, infringed their Fifth Amendment rights to liberty 
and due process and their Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel 
and unusual punishment.161  They claimed that then-Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld and his senior officials conceived their detention and 
treatment as part of a “deliberate and foreseeable” plan.162 
Despite the Rasul plaintiffs’ grisly allegations, the D.C. district court 
granted Rumsfeld’s motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity.163  
Since the issue of the constitutional rights of Guantánamo detainees was 
pending in the court of appeals, the court reserved its ruling on the then-
mandatory merits prong of the Saucier test.164  It skipped to the “clearly es-
tablished” second prong and held that any constitutional rights the Rasul 
plaintiffs may have had were not clearly established at the time of the 
Rumsfeld defendants’ conduct.165  The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s qualified immunity ruling, finding against the plaintiffs on the con-
stitutional merits and holding in the alternative that even if the plaintiffs had 
rights under the Fifth and Eighth Amendments, those rights were not clearly 
established.166  When the Supreme Court granted certiorari, it took the un-
usual path of vacating the D.C. Circuit’s judgment and remanding the case 
for consideration in light of Boumediene.167   
 
158  Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527. 
159  Complaint ¶¶ 2–6, Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2006) (No. 04-1864), aff’d 
sub nom. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d at 644, vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.).  The detai-
nees claimed they were hit with rifle butts, punched, kicked, short-shackled, threatened with unmuzzled 
dogs, forced to strip naked, subjected to cavity searches, exposed to extreme temperatures, kept in dirty 
cages, denied medical care, and deprived of adequate food and sleep.  Id. ¶ 6. 
160  Id. ¶¶ 4–5. 
161  Id. ¶ 7.  The Rasul plaintiffs also claimed that their detention and mistreatment (torture) clearly 
violated U.S. statutes, the Geneva Conventions, and international norms against torture and other cruel 
or degrading treatment.  Id.  This Comment discusses only the Rasul plaintiffs’ Bivens claims. 
162  Id. ¶¶ 8–12 (listing reports and memoranda allegedly formalizing and authorizing the practices). 
163  Rasul, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 40–44. 
164  Id. at 40–41. 
165  Id. at 41–44. 
166  Rasul I, 512 F.3d 644, 665–67 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) (mem.).  
167  129 S. Ct. at 763. 
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Arguably, Boumediene was a liberal move by a Court not willing to 
permit the Executive Branch to make Guantánamo a “legal black hole” 
where military and intelligence officers would be unchecked.168  This re-
mand, then, may signal to lower courts that they should not be reluctant to 
extend additional constitutional protections to the Guantánamo detainees.169  
Whatever the Court’s hopes, when it issued its Pearson decision one month 
after it remanded Rasul I, it ensured that the D.C. Circuit’s second look at 
Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity defense need not involve any constitutional 
inquiry at all.170  On remand the D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argu-
ment that Boumediene required it to engage in a “multi-factor, ‘functional’ 
test to determine whether aliens in their predicament can invoke constitu-
tional rights.”171  Rather, extolling the virtues of judicial restraint and expe-
diency, the Court opted for a one-pronged qualified immunity analysis and 
rested its decision to affirm Rasul I on its finding that any existing rights 
were not clearly established.172 
B. Judicial Awareness: Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft and Padilla v. Yoo 
Since September 11, 2001, the D.C. Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have 
issued conflicting opinions more than once.  For example, in March 2003, 
the D.C. Circuit held that the writ of habeas corpus was not available to 
aliens detained at Guantánamo Bay.173  In December 2003, the Ninth Circuit 
expressed its opposite opinion that Guantánamo Bay was an American terri-
tory for habeas corpus purposes and that “enemy combatants” detained 
there could petition for habeas relief.174  The Ninth Circuit historically has 
been “reliably liberal” on constitutional rights jurisprudence.175  It is there-
fore unsurprising that, given the option by Pearson between avoiding and 
addressing a constitutional question, Ninth Circuit courts have been eager to 
engage.  In doing so, they have recognized the damages-or-nothing posture 
GWOT Bivens actions present. 
 
168  See supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text. 
169  See Vladeck, supra note 136, at 589 n.17.  One could argue instead that remanding “in light of 
Boumediene” was meant to focus the circuit court’s attention on the newness of constitutional rights for 
Guantánamo detainees, which would suggest such rights were not clearly established.  
170  See discussion supra Part I.B.3. 
171  See Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
172  See id. at 529–30.  The court held, in the alternative, that “special factors counseling hesitation” 
would preclude the Bivens claim from moving forward even if qualified immunity was no defense.  Id. 
at 532 n.5.  Many have criticized the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari on Rasul II.  See, e.g., Editori-
al, Yes, It Was Torture, and Illegal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A20. 
173  See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. 
Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
174  See Gherebi v. Bush, 352 F.3d 1278, 1289–94 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) 
(mem.). 
175  See RAUSTIALA, supra note 44, at 169. 
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1. Padilla v. Yoo.—Jose Padilla, although a U.S. citizen, has become 
something of a mascot for GWOT victims.176  Padilla’s Bivens claim, how-
ever, filed against former Deputy Attorney General in the Office of Legal 
Counsel John Yoo, sought a remedy that was not available in his prior 
suits—monetary compensation.177  Holding both that a new Bivens cause of 
action was warranted—the legislature had not provided an alternative re-
medy and no “special factors counsel[ed] hesitation”—and that qualified 
immunity was not available to Yoo, the district court advanced Padilla’s Bi-
vens claims past summary judgment.178 
Officials arrested Padilla in 2002 at Chicago O’Hare Airport pursuant 
to a material witness warrant.179  While Padilla’s motion to vacate the war-
rant was pending, President Bush declared Padilla an “enemy combatant” 
and ordered him taken into protective custody.180  Executive officials de-
tained Padilla without charge for nearly four years at a military brig in 
South Carolina.181  For two of those years, officials denied Padilla access to 
counsel and the outside world.182  Padilla’s Bivens complaint alleged that his 
detention and abusive interrogation183 violated his right to due process, his 
right to legal counsel, and his right to be free from unconstitutional sei-
zures, detentions, and cruel punishment.184  Padilla alleged that Yoo was 
personally culpable for the systematic program of illegal detentions and in-
terrogations that dictated Padilla’s treatment.185   
The district court recognized Padilla’s novel Bivens claim since it 
could not identify an alternative remedy or any preclusive special factors.186  
As a preliminary matter, its decision to recognize the cause of action sup-
ports the viability of Bivens claims for GWOT victims going forward.187  In 
 
176  See, e.g., WITTES, supra note †, at 180 (“[I]t has become somewhat fashionable to describe Pa-
dilla . . . as a small-fry victim of government overreaction . . . .”). 
177  Complaint ¶ 6, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 08-0035) [hereinaf-
ter Padilla Complaint]. 
178  Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–25, 1038, 1039. 
179  Id. at 1012–13. 
180  Id. at 1013. 
181  Id. 
182  See id. at 1014. 
183  See id. (providing a complete list of techniques allegedly used against the petitioner, including 
sleep and sensory deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures and noxious fumes, and long-term 
shackling). 
184  See Padilla Complaint, supra note 177, ¶ 2; see also Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1016–17 (pro-
viding a complete breakdown of the claims Padilla asserted). 
185  Padilla Complaint, supra note 177, ¶ 3.  When Yoo’s “torture memos” became public, scholars, 
politicians, and the public fiercely criticized his legal reasoning; some called for his imprisonment.  See, 
e.g., Margulies, supra note 12, at 234; Maria L. La Ganga, Scholar Calmly Takes Heat for His Memos 
on Torture, L.A. TIMES, May 16, 2005, at A1.  
186  See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1019–30. 
187  But see, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 56365 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (refusing, based 
on special factors, to recognize a Bivens remedy against officials allegedly responsible for the extraordi-
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addressing Yoo’s qualified immunity defense, the court cited both Saucier 
and Pearson before proceeding to discuss the constitutional merits of each 
of Padilla’s claims.188  Unlike the majority of lower courts,189 the district 
court in Padilla apparently was unaffected by temptations of judicial avoid-
ance.  The court made quick work of finding that Padilla’s detention and 
treatment had violated his constitutional rights.190  The court further held 
that the law governing the civilian prison context clearly established the un-
constitutionality of Padilla’s detention and treatment; assigning Padilla a 
special designation did not erase his citizen protections.191  The nascent na-
ture of citizen “enemy combatant” designations at the time of Yoo’s con-
duct did not justify ignorance or dismissal of basic civil constitutional 
rights.192  The court rejected Yoo’s defense of qualified immunity.193  Less 
than three months later, the Ninth Circuit lent credence to the use of a me-
rits-first analysis in detainees’ Bivens actions.  
2. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft.—In 2003, officials arrested U.S. citizen Ab-
dullah al-Kidd at a Dulles airport ticket counter pursuant to a material wit-
ness warrant.194  Executive officials never called al-Kidd to testify195 but 
held him in various prisons for sixteen days, during which time he claims 
that he was only allowed out of his cell for two hours each day and that his 
cell was lit for twenty-four hours each day, and imposed supervised release 
for an additional fourteen months.196  Within months of his release, al-Kidd 
had lost his job and separated from his wife.197  Al-Kidd alleged that then-
Attorney General John Ashcroft had created a policy for using the federal 
material witness statute as a pretext for arresting and detaining terrorism 
suspects.198  
When the Ninth Circuit analyzed Ashcroft’s qualified immunity de-
fense, it acknowledged its recently rejuvenated discretion to abort the 
                                                                                                                           
nary rendition of the alien plaintiff to Syria, where he claimed he was tortured), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3409 (2010).  
188  See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1031–38. 
189  See discussion supra Part I.B. 
190  See Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1034–38.    
191  See id. at 1036–38. 
192  See id. at 1037. 
193  See id. at 1038.  
194  Al-Kidd v. Gonzales (al-Kidd I), No. 05-093, 2006 WL 5429570, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 27, 
2006), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. al-Kidd v. Ashcroft (al-Kidd II), 580 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 
2009), rev’d, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011). 
195  Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954.  
196  Id. at 953. 
197  Id. at 95354. 
198  Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial ¶¶ 8994, al-Kidd I, 2006 WL 5429570 (No. 05-093), 
2005 WL 975750.  Plaintiff al-Kidd pointed to Ashcroft’s press briefings, internal DOJ memoranda, and 
at least one FBI statement touting the arrest of al-Kidd as a success in U.S. efforts to dismantle terrorist 
networks.  Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 954–55. 
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Saucier sequence but, like the Padilla court, chose to address the constitu-
tional question anyway.199  It applied the Saucier sequence, extolling its 
special value in promoting constitutional development and referencing its 
propriety for addressing detainee rights that do not frequently arise in alter-
native legal proceedings.200   
In invoking Pearson, the Ninth Circuit legitimized two important rea-
sons why Saucier sequencing is imperative to GWOT victims’ rights adju-
dication.  First, it noted that GWOT civil rights claims belong in the 
“especially valuable” category that the Pearson court had urged would still 
benefit from application of the two-pronged test.201  Second, it appreciated 
the notice-giving value of two-step qualified immunity holdings.202  Ulti-
mately, the court held that al-Kidd’s Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from pretextual use of the material witness statute to detain him had been 
violated203 and that this right was clearly established when Ashcroft prom-
ulgated the strategy.204  The Ninth Circuit denied Ashcroft qualified immun-
ity.205  In doing so, it cemented the Ninth Circuit’s support for merits-first 
qualified immunity analysis in detainee Bivens actions. 
The Supreme Court overruled the Ninth Circuit on both the question of 
whether Ashcroft’s alleged pretextual use of material witness warrants vi-
olated the Fourth Amendment and the question of whether the unconstitu-
tionality of this practice was clearly established at the time of al-Kidd’s 
 
199  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 964.  The district court had issued its qualified immunity opinion be-
fore Pearson revoked mandatory Saucier sequencing, but the Ninth Circuit still exercised Pearson dis-
cretion because it reviewed the qualified immunity claim de novo after the Supreme Court’s Pearson 
decision.  See id. at 956.  The al-Kidd II court did not consider the propriety of the Bivens cause of ac-
tion because Ashcroft had filed an interlocutory appeal of his immunity claims.  Id.  Because Ashcroft’s 
Supreme Court petition involved only his motion to dismiss on qualified immunity grounds, the Su-
preme Court did not address the propriety of extending a Bivens action to al-Kidd.  See al-Kidd III, 131 
S. Ct. at 2079. 
200  Al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 964 (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009)). 
201  Id. (“[T]he two-step Saucier analysis in the traditional sequence . . . is especially valuable in ad-
dressing constitutional questions such as the one at hand, ‘that do not frequently arise in cases in which a 
qualified immunity defense is unavailable.’” (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818)). 
202  Id. (“[T]he two-step Saucier analysis in the traditional sequence . . . ‘promotes the development 
of constitutional precedent . . . .’” (quoting Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818)). 
203  Id. at 970.  The court rejected the plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment “conditions of confinement” 
claim because he had not sufficiently shown Ashcroft’s plausible personal involvement in setting the 
harsh conditions.  See id. at 979. 
204  See id. at 970–72 (finding the right clearly established by dicta regarding material witness deten-
tions, the definition of probable cause, the history and purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and perhaps 
most uniquely, a footnote in a New York district court case calling out Ashcroft by name and describing 
as illegitimate this reliance on the material witness statute to detain people presumed innocent under the 
Constitution).  The Ninth Circuit is willing to look to a broader range of decisional law than other cir-
cuits, see infra note 224, and the Supreme Court’s al-Kidd III opinion condemned the broadness of the 
Ninth Circuit’s view in no uncertain terms, al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2084 (“We have repeatedly told 
courts—and the Ninth Circuit in particular—not to define clearly established law at a high level of gene-
rality.” (citation omitted)).   
205  See al-Kidd II, 580 F.3d at 973.   
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arrest and detention.206  However, the Court did not disapprove of the Ninth 
Circuit’s use of the merits-first approach to Ashcroft’s qualified immunity 
claim; it acknowledged that its Pearson decision gave lower courts discre-
tion on this analysis and asserted its authority to review whatever rulings 
lower courts decide to issue.207  As Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence sug-
gested,208 the Court’s decision to consider both prongs of the Ninth Circuit’s 
qualified immunity analysis when the second prong alone would have pro-
vided grounds for a resolution of the case allies the Court with the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach.  The Court’s adjudication of the Fourth Amendment 
merits issue shirked constitutional avoidance principles in favor of elaborat-
ing the law—here, determining that this use of material witness warrants is 
not constitutionally condemned209 and implying that officials may pursue 
this course of conduct again in the future. 
Further, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s broad view of what 
types of legal authority can clearly establish a constitutional rule.210  “Ab-
sent controlling authority[,] a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive au-
thority’” is required, and neither solitary district court holdings, let alone 
their dicta, nor broad purposes of constitutional provisions can clearly es-
tablish a legal standard.211  The inability of district court holdings or less 
persuasive authorities to clearly establish legal principles that can guide of-
ficials’ conduct makes merits-first analysis at the circuit level even more 
important.  Thus, despite overturning the ultimate outcome of al-Kidd II, 
the Supreme Court’s al-Kidd III reasoning may amplify the call for Saucier 
sequencing in some cases. 
Padilla v. Yoo and al-Kidd II, as written, are unlikely to persuade other 
courts to abandon their constitutional avoidance tendencies.  First, both cas-
es involved U.S. citizens captured and detained on U.S. soil, which diffe-
rentiates them from many of the cases likely to give rise to GWOT Bivens 
claims.  The al-Kidd II court, however, in explicitly discussing the value of 
the two-step approach for cases like this GWOT Bivens action, showed that 
al-Kidd’s citizenship was not the cause for its adoption of the Saucier se-
quence.  Furthermore, a plaintiff’s U.S. citizenship does not give a court a 
reason to choose the less efficient two-step mechanism.  Finding that the 
right was clearly established when it was violated without considering the 
first constitutional-right prong would equally vindicate the citizen plaintiff 
 
206  Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2085. 
207  Id. at 2080. 
208  See id. at 2089–90 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“We have never considered 
whether an official’s subjective intent matters for purposes of the Fourth Amendment in [this] novel 
context, and we need not and should not resolve that question in this case.  All Members of the Court 
agree that, whatever the merits of the underlying Fourth Amendment question, Ashcroft did not violate 
clearly established law.”). 
209  Id. at 2080–83 (majority opinion). 
210  Id. at 2083–85. 
211  Id. 
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and equally acknowledge the existence of the violation and the right at 
hand.  More importantly, other courts understandably will want an explana-
tion as to why the concerns that led the Supreme Court to retract the Sauci-
er mandate in the first place do not counsel against applying the merits-first 
sequence in the detainees’ Bivens cases. 
IV. RESPONDING TO THE CRITICS 
A. Why Saucier’s Potential Dangers Are Less Compelling in the Global War 
on Terror 
Back in 2001, courts and scholars did not respond uniformly to Sauci-
er’s mandatory two-step analysis.  Many harshly criticized the prescription 
of merits-first adjudication based on fundamental principles of resource 
conservation and constitutional passivity thought to govern the federal judi-
ciary.  Foreseeably, these critics might disagree with using the Saucier se-
quence even in cases the Pearson Court declared would still benefit from it.  
The familiar arguments against Saucier sequencing, however, are not com-
pelling in the GWOT Bivens context.   
Critics have argued that Saucier sequencing’s potential to simulta-
neously declare a right and yet deny recovery because that right was not 
clearly established violates the famous Marbury v. Madison principle that 
“where there is a right, there must be a remedy.”212  However, Marbury it-
self undermines the strictness of any right–remedy principle.213  The Mar-
bury Court resolved a number of significant constitutional questions 
without ultimately awarding any remedy.214  The right–remedy rule may 
rank below the need for a “general structure” of constitutional remedies to 
ensure the government behaves lawfully.215  This hierarchy of right–remedy 
understanding conforms to contemporary jurisprudence and facilitates the 
development of constitutional law.216  Because Saucier sequencing permits 
 
212  See, e.g., Leong, supra note 63, at 702–06 & n.38 (quoting Marbury’s right–remedy maxim and 
explaining judges’ potential cognitive dissonance in recognizing a right without granting a remedy in 
Saucier analyses).  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (holding that 
legal rights, when violated, must have remedies); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Consti-
tutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1999) (introducing scholarly protest to the absence of a remedy 
in any constitutional adjudication). 
213  See John M.M. Greabe, Mirabile Dictum!: The Case for “Unnecessary” Constitutional Rulings 
in Civil Rights Damages Actions, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 403, 419 (1999). 
214  Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and Constitutional Re-
medies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1800–01 (1991). 
215  See Jeffries, supra note 212, at 88–90 (quoting and discussing Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 214, 
at 1736, but also arguing that full individual remediation should remain the ideal even if it is sometimes 
subverted in the name of securing broader constitutional rights development).  The D.C. Circuit recently 
agreed that constitutional law does not always reflect the Marbury maxim: “Not every violation of a 
right yields a remedy, even when the right is constitutional.”  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (mem.). 
216  Jeffries, supra note 212, at 88–90. 
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courts to recognize a novel right without awarding a remedy, courts can 
elaborate and update constitutional understandings at a lower cost to execu-
tive officials who were unaware at the time that their conduct was unconsti-
tutional.217  
 Some observers contend that Saucier’s vision of qualified immunity 
may leave constitutional tort plaintiffs little incentive to sue.  In some cases, 
their suits may only subsidize the development of constitutional law that 
will benefit not them, but those on whom government officials may act in 
the future.218  “Precedent-seeking law firms” and other third-party organiza-
tions, however, likely will offset plaintiffs’ reluctance to sue.219  This has 
been the case with Guantánamo litigation to date.  Major U.S. law firms and 
ideological rights-supportive groups have represented the Guantánamo de-
tainees,220 and there is no reason to believe their interest in publicity, or their 
generosity, will cease to exist when detainees want to file Bivens actions to 
recover for their constitutional injuries. 
Other commentators maintain that Saucier decisions about the consti-
tutional merits of claims that ultimately fail on “clearly established” 
grounds are dicta that should not govern the outcomes of future cases.221  Of 
course, viewing these rights decisions as nonprecedential would erode the 
constitutional-development value of Saucier sequencing.  The first-prong 
articulation of a constitutional right is what deters future violations of the 
right and takes away officials’ qualified immunity defenses in future suits 
for violations of the right.  According to the Supreme Court’s recent Ca-
mreta v. Greene decision, this “significant future effect on the conduct of 
public officials . . . and the policies of the government units to which they 
belong”222 means that first-prong constitutional determinations cannot logi-
 
217  See id. at 99–100 (arguing that qualified immunity analysis “allows courts to embrace [constitu-
tional] innovation without the potentially paralyzing cost of full remediation” for officials’ past viola-
tions).  
218  See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 810; see also Landau, supra note 132, at 675 (“It would not 
be a stretch therefore to argue that many of the detainees—if they could choose—might be better off 
with a procedural resolution than a decision of substance.”).  
219  See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 809–10. 
220  See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Official Attacks Top Law Firms over Detainees, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 
2007, at A1 (reporting that Michael Ratner, from the Center for Constitutional Rights, had received of-
fers to aid in detainee representation from “about 500 lawyers from about 120 law firms”); Pro Bono, 
COVINGTON & BURLING LLP, http://www.cov.com/probonooverview/probono.aspx?show=
morehighlights (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) (reporting that the firm represents fourteen men detained at 
Guantánamo Bay); Pro Bono & Public Service—Guantanamo Bay, JENNER & BLOCK, 
http://www.jenner.com/probono/probono.asp?id=000014186424 (last visited Aug. 20, 2011) (reporting 
that its lawyers had represented more than a dozen Guantánamo Bay detainees).  
221  See Ted Sampsell-Jones, Reviving Saucier: Prospective Interpretations of Criminal Laws, 
14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 75960 (2007).  
222  Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011). 
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cally be classified as “mere dicta or ‘statements in opinions.’”223  Even 
where the second-prong analysis finds the rights were not clearly estab-
lished, constitutional decisions can still notify officials of what constitu-
tional rights exist and what conduct may violate them.224  Indeed, the United 
States has claimed that a first-prong constitutional merits ruling can “ha[ve] 
an effect similar to an injunction or a declaratory judgment against the gov-
ernment as a whole.”225  In turn, this notice can chip away at any future 
qualified immunity claims that the unconstitutionality of the kind of deten-
tions they considered was not clearly established in 2009.226 
Given the purely prospective value of recognizing a constitutional right 
that was not clearly established, some characterize such decisions as im-
permissible advisory opinions.227 Similarly, they claim that where the de-
fendant official is confident either that the constitutional right at issue was 
not clearly established, or that it does not exist at all, the official may de-
 
223  Id. (quoting California v. Rooney, 483 U.S. 307, 311 (1987)).  But see id. at 2037 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that a lower court’s ruling on the constitutional merits of a qualified immunity 
claim, where that court goes on to find the constitutional rule not clearly established and thus awards the 
defendant qualified immunity, constitutes a dictum “not to be treated as a judgment standing on its 
own”). 
224  See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 221, at 759–60; see also Melissa Armstrong, Note, Rule Prag-
matism: Theory and Application to Qualified Immunity Analysis, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 107, 
126–27 (2004) (“Even assuming that dicta are less reliable, the Second Circuit offers at least a partial 
mitigation of its own accuracy concern.  As long as everyone understands that the finding of a constitu-
tional violation is dictum not binding on a future court facing a similar fact pattern, the likelihood that 
the first court was mistaken presents less of a danger.  In other words, the dictum of the first case merely 
puts officials on notice that certain conduct probably violates rights, removing the availability of quali-
fied immunity, but does not burden them in the second case with binding precedent on point about the 
existence of a rights violation.” (footnote omitted)).  
The Supreme Court has not firmly established the sources of decisional law a court may consult in 
determining whether a right has been clearly established.  See Catlett, supra note 152, at 1041.  Control-
ling precedent or a “robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority’” that does not conflict with con-
trolling precedent suffices to clearly establish a legal rule.  Al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2084 (2011) 
(quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)).  The Court has implied that cases outside the con-
trolling circuit might inform the analysis.  Catlett, supra note 152, at 1041–42.  Some federal circuits, 
including the Ninth Circuit, have recognized dicta as a source of decisional law that can establish a con-
stitutional right as clearly established, the broadest standard employed by the circuits, id. at 1048, but the 
Supreme Court rejects this “high level of generality,” see al-Kidd III, 131 S. Ct. at 2084. 
225  Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae at 13, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020). 
226  See id. at 2030 (majority opinion) (explaining that first-prong constitutional rulings are “rulings 
self-consciously designed to [affect government officials’ behavior] by establishing controlling law and 
preventing invocations of immunity in later cases” and “with [the] Court’s permission, to promote clari-
ty—and observance—of constitutional rules”).  However, there may be a limitation on which courts’ 
qualified immunity decisions can serve these purposes: “district court decisions—unlike those from the 
courts of appeals—do not necessarily settle constitutional standards or prevent repeated claims of quali-
fied immunity.”  Id. at 2033 n.7. 
227  See, e.g., id. at 2037–38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that permitting Supreme Court re-
view of first-prong constitutional rulings where an official prevails on his qualified immunity claim in 
the second prong of the analysis amounts to issuing advisory opinions); Healy, supra note 61, at 902–04. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 862 
cline to expend resources to argue the constitutional merits.228  While this 
argument is compelling—surely, new constitutional law should only arise 
out of hearty motions practices—it ignores government institutions’ strong 
motivations to fight vigorously against the declaration of new constitutional 
rights.  Those rights, after all, could complicate their task of crafting consti-
tutionally compliant policies and could expose their officials to liability.229  
In practice, government defendants rarely decide not to contest a novel con-
stitutional claim when asserting qualified immunity because the disputed 
right is often a matter of “institutional concern.”230   
The government defendants in GWOT Bivens cases are especially un-
likely to forego arguing novel constitutional issues especially when the con-
stitutional rights involve a new type of enemy engaged in a new and 
potentially multigenerational type of war.  Additionally, since few detainees 
have brought Bivens claims thus far, it is doubtful that a lack of government 
resources will preclude executive officials from fervently litigating the con-
stitutional questions these suits raise.  The high concentration of potentially 
far-reaching constitutional implications in detainees’ Bivens actions further 
supports this prediction. 
Saucier sequencing also presents the problem of insulating from appel-
late review a court’s finding that a constitutional right exists.  As the argu-
ment goes, because parties may appeal only adverse outcomes, a defendant 
who wins on the “clearly established” prong cannot appeal a court’s consti-
tutional finding even though, for many government officials, the court’s 
recognition of a new constitutional right or contour of a constitutional right 
is more detrimental than the case’s dismissal is beneficial.231  In May 2011, 
the Supreme Court created an exception to the general rule against appeals 
of favorable outcomes for qualified immunity cases, recognizing that they 
 
228  See Healy, supra note 61, at 856 (“Because a ruling on the constitutional issue in these cases can 
never affect the outcome, there is a greater risk that the [constitutional] issue will not be argued vigo-
rously and that the Court’s decision will therefore be inadequately informed.”). 
229  See, e.g., Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2041 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (pointing out the United States’ 
amicus curiae argument that first-prong constitutional rulings sometimes alter or control government 
policy and officials’ conduct as much as an injunction or declaratory judgment would).   
Indemnification practices further incentivize the government to argue fully the novel constitutional 
right asserted in a detainee’s Bivens action.  Cf. David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 330–31 (2009) (explaining that individuals are rarely personally liable for 
torts they commit in the course of their duties because of the government’s policy of indemnifying its 
employees). 
230  Greabe, supra note 213, at 435 (emphasis added).  One commentator has pointed out that even 
outside the GWOT context, the thousands of cases decided between 2001 and 2009 under Saucier have 
not yielded obvious examples of disastrously uninformed dispositions.  See Sampsell-Jones, supra note 
221, at 761. 
231  See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 67, at 414–17 (describing this phenomenon in the context of Bunt-
ing v. Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019 (1998), in which the Supreme Court declined to review a decision that the 
Virginia Military Institute’s dinner prayer tradition was unconstitutional because the Fourth Circuit had 
found that right was not clearly established and thus had granted the Institute qualified immunity); Jef-
fries, supra note 85, at 127–28 (same). 
105:829  (2011) Qualified Immunity and the Global War on Terror 
 863 
represent “a special category when it comes to [the Supreme Court’s] re-
view of appeals brought by winners.”232  The danger that novel constitution-
al rulings otherwise could be insulated from review might lead lower courts 
to avoid articulating constitutional rulings in qualified immunity cases.233  
The “regular policy of avoidance sometimes does not fit the qualified im-
munity situation because it threatens to leave standards of official conduct 
permanently in limbo,”234 so an exception that “permit[s] lower courts to 
avoid avoidance” was justified.235  As constructed, the exception requires 
that the appealing litigant have a continuing “personal stake” in the appeal 
to preserve the case or controversy.236  This personal stake exists in quali-
fied immunity cases, the Court reasoned, because a first-prong constitution-
al ruling causes a government official to “either change the way he 
performs his duties or risk a meritorious damages action.”237  In the wake of 
Camreta, the unreviewability dilemma does not condemn Saucier sequenc-
ing.  
Finally, any argument that Saucier sequencing’s mandatory first prong 
is inefficient bears less weight given that a constitutional question’s adjudi-
cation in one case prevents the need for its adjudication in future cases.238  
That said, Pearson acknowledges one possible exception to this: where the 
constitutional question is already pending in a higher court.239  In the 
GWOT context, there will undoubtedly be future cases.  The U.S. struggle 
to dismantle extremist terrorist regimes is a long-term endeavor.  Osama bin 
Laden’s death has not dismantled al Qaeda’s increasingly diffuse network 
of affiliates, and in general, terrorist networks have become self-reliant and 
largely independent of central leadership.240  U.S. strategies will continue to 
 
232  Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030 (majority opinion).  Some scholars have been calling for this type of 
narrow exception.  See Jeffries, supra note 85, at 127 n.47 (quoting Bunting, 541 U.S. at 1023 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari)); Leong, supra note 63, at 678–79.  Moreover, this exception is 
congruent with the existing exception to the final judgment rule, which allows officials to file interlocu-
tory appeals of denials of motions to dismiss or denials of summary judgment if their appeals pertain to 
qualified immunity.  See Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Con-
sequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. REV. 809, 825 (2010). 
This exception is sure to generate vigorous debate because it effectively forgives what have tradi-
tionally been considered deficiencies of constitutionally mandated standing requirements.  See, e.g., Orin 
Kerr, Camreta v. Greene and Article III Standing, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 26, 2011, 2:16 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2011/05/26/camreta-v-greene-and-article-iii-standing.  Indeed, several Justices ob-
jected on such grounds.  See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2037–34 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
233  See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030–32 (majority opinion). 
234  Id. at 2031. 
235  Id.  
236  Id. at 2029. 
237  Id.   
238  See Leong, supra note 63, at 680–82. 
239  See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 819 (2009). 
240  See, e.g., Nathan Freier, Bin Laden’s Gone: What Now for Defense Policy?, CENTER FOR 
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (May 4, 2011), http://csis.org/publication/bin-ladens-gone-what-now-
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include the detention of suspected al Qaeda terrorist cell members and Tali-
ban fighters even if wartime exigencies abate.  Just as surely, some of these 
detentions will be mistakes.  There is no long-run efficiency to be gained, or 
cost to be saved, by omitting Saucier first-prong constitutional adjudica-
tions now. 
B. Why the Courts Should Not Defer: The Judiciary’s Role in the Global 
War on Terror 
Since GWOT victims’ rights are unlikely to develop outside of Bivens 
actions, courts should follow the Saucier sequence when adjudicating the 
qualified immunity defenses raised in these suits.  The Saucier sequence 
contemplates an active rights-defining and notice-giving role for the judi-
ciary despite the availability of a one-pronged test that can support a dispo-
sition.  In this way, the Saucier sequence betrays popularized principles of 
judicial avoidance.241  The familiar call for judicial passivity is even louder 
where cases involve executive wartime conduct.  This section justifies the 
Judiciary Branch’s role in elaborating and defining GWOT victims’ rights 
that will constrain and, more importantly, guide executive decisionmaking. 
Judicial passivity is not always a virtue.  “Minimalist” judicial philoso-
phies come with unbalanced costs in the form of cyclic litigation, hardships 
on individual plaintiffs, and the consumption of resources.242  Furthermore, 
avoidance in the lower courts leads to a less robust body of lower court law 
for the Supreme Court to mine for an ideal rule.243  Finally, the propriety of 
more gradual constitutional development is not at all clear.244  Several his-
torical periods have seen rapid and profound changes in constitutional juri-
sprudence that have survived the march of time, such as the equal 
protection revolution of the mid-1900s.245  When judicial intervention clash-
es with executive wartime prerogatives, however, separation-of-powers 
principles usually sway in favor of less judicial participation. 
One of the primary objections to the judicial review of executive ac-
tions is that the possibility of liability will impede swift executive deci-
                                                                                                                           
defense-policy; Eric Schmitt, Bin Laden’s Death Doesn’t Mean the End of Al Qaeda, N.Y. TIMES (May 
2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/world/asia/03terror.html. 
241  See Leong, supra note 63, at 67678. 
242  See Fiss, supra note 137, at 657; see also Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency: Misunders-
tanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 301, 303–12 (2009) (providing a thoughtful 
discussion about how strict adherence to clear rules during times of emergency can increase national se-
curity). 
243  See Catlett, supra note 152, at 1051 (“Sometimes a legal issue is better fleshed out when it is 
considered by multiple judges with differing viewpoints. . . .  ‘The many circuit courts act as the “la-
boratories” of new or refined legal principles . . . providing the Supreme Court with a wide array of ap-
proaches to legal issues and thus, hopefully, with the raw material from which to fashion better 
judgments.’” (quoting J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercircuit Conflicts: A Solution 
Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 929 (1983)) (footnote omitted)). 
244  See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 214, at 1803–04 & n.396. 
245  See Greabe, supra note 213, at 435–36.  
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sionmaking and deter or delay action when it is needed most.  Judicially 
imposed liability may, it famously has been said, “dampen the ardor of all 
but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge 
of their duties.”246  These policy arguments against an active Judiciary 
Branch become considerably louder when judges seek to review executive 
activities during war.   
The potential for detrimental executive hesitation does not mean, how-
ever, that the judiciary must sit idly by while actions taken in the name of 
national security and victory in warfare threaten the liberties these lethal 
and expensive wars seek to protect.  It is, after all, the judiciary’s funda-
mental purpose to “say what the law is.”247  Arguments that the judiciary 
should have a seat at the metaphorical table in wartime248 are even stronger 
in the context of this new, unfamiliar, and potentially long-term global 
war.249  This war is “amorphous” and is fought against an ill-defined ene-
my.250  In this type of war, an outside minority—here, the Guantánamo de-
tainees—will likely bear the burden of our fearful, self-preservationist 
reactions.251   
The federal courts have expansive authority to assess the legality of 
both U.S. domestic and extraterritorial detention and other executive con-
duct.252  While decisions to commit troops are presidential prerogatives, de-
terminations about how the Constitution applies to extraterritorial activities 
may best be addressed by judges.253  Whether the judiciary constitutionally 
can review executive detention and military activities, however, does not 
settle whether it should.   
The infrequency of wartime opportunities for legal issues to ripen and 
come before the Supreme Court, coupled with the need to imbue the law 
governing wartime activities with contemporary constitutional sensibilities, 
also militates in favor of reasonable nonavoidance policies during war-
time.254  Courts must review wartime activity in order to bring wartime laws 
 
246  Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).  
247  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  Moreover, judicial involvement will 
not undermine the military as an authoritarian institution.  See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in 
Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.  441, 442, 460–61 (1999).  
248  See Fiss, supra note 137, at 659. 
249  To be sure, some commentators disagree.  See, e.g., WITTES, supra note †, at 257–58 (arguing 
that trying to answer “war on terror” dilemmas with the Constitution and past precedents is “an illusion” 
and that, in this new war, “we are the Founders”).  Wittes acknowledges, however, that, in the long run, 
a seat at the table for the Judiciary Branch could at most “prove harmless” to the Executive Branch’s 
ability to do its job.  Id. at 123. 
250  Fiss, supra note 137, at 659. 
251  Id.  
252  Pfander, supra note 94, at 499. 
253  See Leah E. Kraft, Comment, The Judiciary’s Opportunity to Protect International Human 
Rights: Applying the U.S. Constitution Extraterritorially, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 1073, 1102–03 (2004).  
254  Professor Jeffries argues that excluding judges from qualified immunity analyses could lead “the 
Constitution [to] be defined not by what judges, in their wisdom, think it does or should mean, but by 
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into compliance with constitutional understandings that have evolved since 
the creation of previous wartime jurisprudence.  When President Bush and 
the DOJ were called upon to present the legal justifications for the deten-
tions at Guantánamo Bay, they were relegated to discussing fifty-year-old 
precedents.255  One case they relied upon, Johnson v. Eisentrager,256 had 
been meaningfully discussed by the Supreme Court only once in the five 
decades between its writing and September 11, 2001.257  The absence of 
subsequent opportunities for courts to clarify Eisentrager, namely wartime 
detentions, had amplified its original lack of clarity.258   
Nonavoidance policies serve a critical notice-giving function.  By say-
ing “what the law is” at the few and intermittent wartime opportunities the 
judiciary has, the judiciary guarantees that, when facing the next threat, the 
President will be able to rely on constitutional law that reflects, at worst, the 
law at the time of the most recent war rather than law that has not been up-
dated in decades.  In the absence of this judicial guidance, “an Executive 
solicitous of civil liberties has no way of knowing how to structure a deten-
tion policy to minimize its potential unconstitutionality.”259  President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s approach to the World War II Japanese internments 
and Attorney General Francis Biddle’s statements are demonstrative: 
Biddle . . . wrote that “the constitutional difficulty” of the Japanese intern-
ments did not seem to worry President Roosevelt.  “That was a question of 
law, which ultimately the Supreme Court must decide.  And mean-
whileprobably a long meanwhilewe must get on with the war.”  This 
shows that Presidents can anticipate and exploit the Court’s procrastination.  
On the other hand, it also suggests Roosevelt would have heeded judicial guid-
ance had it been available.  He was wrong about one thing: A Supreme Court 
practicing abstention need not decide anything.  Thus “meanwhile” has lasted 
to this very day.260 
President Bush’s detention decisions in the wake of the September 11, 
2001 attacks similarly suffered from a lack of prescient constitutional 
precedent.  The Eisentrager-based belief that Guantánamo Bay would 
shield operations there from judicial scrutiny significantly motivated Presi-
dent Bush’s decision to hold suspected al Qaeda terrorists and Taliban figh-
                                                                                                                           
the most grudging conception that an executive officer could reasonably entertain.”  Jeffries, supra note 
85, at 120. 
255  See al Maqaleh II, 605 F.3d 84, 90, 92 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Vladeck, supra note 136, at 60406. 
256  339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
257  See Vladeck, supra note 136, at 600.  The case that discussed Eisentrager was United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
258  See Vladeck, supra note 136, at 600. 
259  See Kontorovich, supra note 51, at 805.  
260  Id. (quoting FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 219 (1962)) (footnote omitted).  
105:829  (2011) Qualified Immunity and the Global War on Terror 
 867 
ters there.261  These examples highlight why courts should aim to provide 
timely and decipherable wartime opinions to the other decisionmaking 
branches during wartime.262   
Moreover, judicial avoidance maneuvers can bind the judiciary to a 
certain decisional path without a full deliberative process.  As Professor 
Jenny Martinez has explained, 
[T]he Court’s procedural approach does not leave these substantive questions 
genuinely open for de novo review some other day.  Having invited Congress 
to fix things, for example, the Court has put itself in an institutionally weaker 
position to later strike down Congress’s fix on rights-based grounds.  Moreo-
ver, having applied the law of war to al Qaeda detainees, the Court has made it 
difficult to later find that the “war on terror” may not really be a war at all.  
And the Court has done so without the benefit of fully considering the substan-
tive or rights-based arguments.263 
The Judiciary’s task of defining rights and educating the Executive, in 
many situations, would be subsidiary to the Legislature’s duty to promul-
gate legislation that serves these purposes.  In this new war, however, the 
legislature has failed utterly to delineate constitutional limits for the Execu-
tive Branch.264  Since the Obama Administration has decided not to request 
congressional articulation of the contours of the United States’ noncriminal 
detention scheme,265 Congress is unlikely to do so in the near future.  More-
over, the judiciary maintains an apolitical duty to protect the rights of mi-
norities especially at times when the legislature, practically speaking, 
 
261  See RAUSTIALA, supra note 44, at 196.  As the DOJ noted, Guantánamo Bay was “probably free 
of the influence of the American courts due to its location outside the territory of the United States.”  Id. 
at 187.  
Guantánamo was ideal for other reasons, too.  It is far from Middle Eastern hostilities and very se-
cure.  Id.  As the American general in charge of the Afghan invasion, Tommy Franks, explained, al 
Qaeda and Taliban captives resisted their detention with such violence that the government needed to 
move them to a more secure location.  Id. at 195. 
262  Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 522 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring), cert. de-
nied, 130 S. Ct. 1880 (2010). 
263  Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 
1030 (2008).  
264  See Editorial, A New Approach, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 2003, at B6 (“One of the great problems 
with the legal response to 9/11 has been Congress’s unwillingness to do its job and write law. . . .  By 
inaction, it has left the resolution of such issues to a dialogue between the executive branch and the 
courts . . . .”); see also WITTES, supra note †, at 123 (“With Congress content for so long to duck re-
sponsibility for policy choices . . . , the alternative to some assertion of judicial power may have been an 
unchecked executive . . . .”); Landau, supra note 132, at 697 (pointing out that “individual members of 
Congress . . . openly declared their belief in [the Military Commission Act’s] unconstitutionality” even 
though they voted for it); Kiik, supra note 12, at 1973 (“Congress has twice issued legislation addressing 
detainee treatment without creating . . . [or] explicitly prohibit[ing] remedies for these violations . . . .  
And the Supreme Court has never suggested that congressional inaction prohibits an extension of Bi-
vens . . . .”). 
265  WITTES ET AL., supra note 96, at 4 (citing Peter Finn, Administration Won’t Seek New Detention 
System, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2009, at A10).  
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cannot do so for fear of constituent ire.  Few savvy politicians would 
present or support a bill to establish meaningful limits on the military’s or 
federal intelligence agencies’ power to detain suspected terrorists on the ba-
sis that those terrorists have inviolable rights.  This may be especially true 
after the killing of Osama bin Laden by U.S. Navy SEALs, a military suc-
cess that spawned patriotic demonstrations and celebrations across the 
United States;266 few politicians will be willing to dampen the long-awaited 
sense of victory with hand-tying legislation. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Supreme Court’s Pearson decision gives courts the op-
tion to avoid deciding the constitutional issues underlying the detainees’ 
suits, an option sure to be popular given the stakes, the Court also empha-
sized that at times constitutional development and notice-giving will still re-
ly on the Saucier two-prong protocol.  It reiterated the importance of this 
subset of cases in Camreta v. Greene.267  Because GWOT detainees other-
wise have no opportunities to mount a meaningful challenge to executive 
detention policies,268 Bivens actions present one such scenario.  Constitu-
tional adjudication in these cases is even more important because the offi-
cial conduct being challenged is likely to involve technologies and methods 
the Executive Branch has never before deployed, at least not in a wartime 
context.  Therefore, courts can serve not only a notice-giving purpose, but 
also a constitutional-updating purpose.269  Employing the two-step Saucier 
approach in these cases will also avoid repeated unconstitutional abuses 
that, in the absence of a judicial ruling to “clearly establish” them as such, 
could continue into perpetuity with court after court deciding that any rights 
the detainees may have are not clearly established.270  For these reasons, the 
lower courts should follow the Ninth Circuit’s lead and invoke Saucier se-
quencing when deciding the validity of qualified immunity defenses raised 
in detainee Bivens actions.  If the lower courts continue to decline to do so, 
the Supreme Court should clarify that detainees’ Bivens actions are precise-
ly the type of claim for which Pearson declares Saucier analysis to be “es-
pecially valuable.” 
 
266 See, e.g., Michael Murray, Osama Bin Laden Dead: The Navy SEALs Who Hunted and Killed Al 
Qaeda Leader, ABCNEWS (May 2, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/US/osama-bin-laden-dead-navy-seal-
team-responsible/story?id=13509739; William M. Welch, Bin Laden Death Prompts Celebrations, Ref-
lection, USA TODAY (May 2, 2011, 6:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-03-
reaction-bin-laden-death_n.htm. 
267  See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2031 n.5 (2011). 
268  See supra Part II.  
269  See Greabe, supra note 213, at 407–10 (making a similar “new technologies” argument in a 
more general context and advocating a Saucier-like test in civil rights damages actions).  
270  See Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2030–32; Greabe, supra note 213, at 407–10; Jeffries, supra note 85, 
at 120–21; Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies Split, 88 VA. L. REV. 1, 50 (2002). 
